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IMPROVING CRIMINAL JURY VERDICTS:
LEARNING FROM THE COURT-MARTIAL
ROBERT F. HOLLAND*
Twelve jurors retire into a closed room to deliberate on the verdict in a
felony trial. After they elect a foreman and discuss the evidence, their
individual positions begin to emerge. Nine jurors feel strongly that the
defendant is guilty, but several jurors argue for acquittal. The judge has
instructed them that they must all agree on any verdict, but has given them
no guidance on what procedure to use to determine their verdict.
Frustration rises over the inability to convince the minority bloc to go
along with the majority sentiment. Someone points out that if the twelve
cannot unanimously agree, the judge will declare a mistrial, and the
defendant will face another long trial in front of a new jury. The jurors
holding out for acquittal feel the mounting pressure, and long for some
means to vote their consciences without deadlocking the collective decision.
There must be a better way for the criminal jury to reach its verdict-and
there is. State law ought to permit a super-majority of the twelve jurors to
render a verdict of guilty, and when the required majority cannot be
convinced of guilt, then a "not guilty" verdict should automatically result.
Requiring each juror to indicate her final individual position on the verdict
by a secret written ballot of "guilty" or "not guilty, " coupled with an
assured outcome of either conviction or acquittal, will protect the integrity
of the verdict as a collective expression of the individual jurors'
consciences, rather than as a result of the majority browbeating the
exhausted and outnumbered dissenters into submission. Changing state
trial procedure to this approach will also promote thorough discussion of
all points of view among the jurors, and eliminate the inefficiency of the
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hung jury situation. Fortunately, one American criminal justice system has
successfully used such a radical procedure for reaching jury verdicts for
almost forty years, and this Article discusses why such procedures should
be adopted by states for their criminal jury trials.
I. INTRODUCTION
One of the recurring themes in recent American legal scholarship is the
inadequacy of the contemporary jury system.' Some proposals for criminal
jury "reform" suggest that we abandon our reliance on juries as arbiters of
the facts and, ultimately, of culpability, while others propose to increase the
jurors' participation in the trial process to improve the jury's performance
in its crucial role as factfinder.2 This Article suggests that adopting several
specific procedures used by the modem 3 American court-martial would
enhance the effectiveness and finality of verdicts in state jury trials for non-
capital 4 criminal cases: reaching the verdict based upon the consensus of a
super-majority 5 of the jurors, through secret written ballot, 6 with acquittal
resulting for any charge for which a guilty verdict is not reached.7
1 See Douglas G. Smith, Structural and Functional Aspects of the Jury: Comparative
Analysis and Proposals for Reform, 48 ALA. L. REV. 441, 443-44 & n.2 (1997) (citing
numerous books and articles critical of the jury as a crucial component of the American
justice system).
2 See id. at 447 (categorizing the proposals as "two competing models for reform of the
adjudicatory process [with] one advocating more inquisitorial procedures based
on... procedures followed in civil law jurisdictions, and [the other] advocating a more
active role for the jury in order to improve its [performance as] finder of fact").
3 For purposes of defining "modem" American courts-martial practice, the year 1969
serves as a meaningful benchmark for the start of the modem era. Since 1969, courts-martial
have included a military judge and a group of voting members with roles corresponding,
respectively, to the roles of the trial judge and jury familiar to American criminal trial
practitioners. See generally discussion infra Section II. Before 1969, by contrast, American
courts-martial did not have a legally-trained presiding officer, and the role of the members
was substantially different than that of jurors in the civilian sector. See Military Justice Act
of 1968, Pub. L. No. 90-632, 82 Stat. 1335-1343 (1968) (creating the position of military
judge and defining the powers of such officers in courts-martial). See generally Kevin J.
Barry, A Face Lift (and Much More) for an Aging Beauty: The Cox Commission
Recommendations to Rejuvenate the Uniform Code of Military Justice, 2002 LAW REV.
M.S.U.-D.C.L. 57, 73-74 (2002) (summarizing pre-1969 military trial practices and the
significance of adding military judges to courts-martial).
4 This Article does not address trial procedures peculiar to capital cases, where military
practice requires the unanimous agreement of twelve (or more) jurors upon an aggravating
circumstance, like those employed by the states since Furman v. Georgia, 408 U.S. 238
(1972), in order to reach a guilty verdict and to impose the death penalty. See UCMJ
art. 25a, 10 U.S.C.A. § 825a (2001); 2 FRANCIS A. GILLIGAN & FREDRIC I. LEDERER, COURT-
MARTIAL PROCEDURE § 23-32.10 (2d ed. 1999 & Supp. 2003).
5 See discussion infra Section III.C.2.
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Readers may ask whether the scope of modem military criminal
practice provides significant experience from which civilian practitioners
could learn anything useful. Are there enough military criminal trials to
offer any meaningful comparison, as opposed to minor anecdotal interest?
Are the types of allegations handled by courts-martial significant enough to
offer any real parallel to criminal trials in civilian society?
With regard to the first question, the number of courts-martial is
indeed significant enough for comparative purposes. Since 2000, courts-
martial have tried almost 28,000 American military personnel. 8  Further,
with approximately 1.4 million American military personnel currently on
active duty9 (and thus potentially affected by the military criminal justice
system), military trials conducted under the Uniform Code of Military
Justice (UCMJ)' 0 affect a larger population than eleven states and the
District of Columbia. l l  In short, both the number of courts-martial
conducted and the number of American citizens subject to the court-martial
process are comparable in magnitude to many of our smaller state
jurisdictions.
To answer the second question, courts-martial routinely decide the
guilt or innocence of Americans charged with an incredibly wide range of
6 See discussion infra Section III.D.
7 See discussion infra Section III.C.3.
8 This figure was calculated from data reported by each of the armed services separately
for fiscal years (FY) 2000 through 2005, including both general and special courts-martial.
See U.S. COURT OF APPEAL FOR THE ARMED FORCES, ANNUAL REPORT OF THE CODE
COMMITTEE ON MILITARY JUSTICE (2000-2005 annually), available at
http://www.armfor.uscourts.gov/Annual.htm [hereinafter USCAAF ANNUAL REPORT].
9 The average active duty troop strength of the United States armed forces was calculated
by adding the average active duty manpower strength of the Army, Navy, Marine Corps, Air
Force, and Coast Guard as reported separately by each of the armed services at the end of FY
2005. The annual report includes a statistical table at the end of each of the several reports
from the Judge Advocates General of the armed services; Part 10 of each report gives the
average active duty strength (in manpower) during FY 2005 for that particular service. See
USCAAF ANNUAL REPORT (2005), supra note 8.
10 Uniform Code of Military Justice, 10 U.S.C. §§ 801-940 (2000). In this Article,
particular statutory provisions within the UCMJ are cited as "UCMJ art. __ 10 U.S.C.
§ " because those who practice or study military criminal law are accustomed to
references to the appropriate article of the UCMJ rather than to the differently numbered
provisions of the United States Code's Title 10.
Ii Each of the eleven smallest states and the District of Columbia had populations of less
than 1.4 million persons, according to the United States Census Bureau's 2005 estimates of
state populations. See U.S. CENSUS BUREAU, TABLE 1: ANNUAL ESTIMATES OF THE
POPULATION FOR THE UNITED STATES AND STATES, AND FOR PUERTO RICO, APRIL 1, 2000 TO
JULY 1, 2005 (NST-EST2005-01) (2005), available at http://www.census.gov/popest/states/
NST-ann-est.html. Thus, the military forces of the United States might be described as our
thirty-ninth largest American criminal court jurisdiction.
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criminal offenses, 12 whether those offenses were committed in the United
States or abroad, and whether the offenses occurred on a military
installation or in a "civilian" setting. 3 The offenses tried by courts-martial
may involve victims who are civilian or military, 14 and courts-martial have
jurisdiction even where parallel prosecution by civilian authorities (federal,
state, or foreign) would be feasible.' 5 As long as the person accused is a
12 See UCMJ art. 18, 10 U.S.C. § 818 (general court-martial has jurisdiction to try
persons subject to the UCMJ for "any offense made punishable by [chapter 47 of Title 10, or
the UCMJ]"); id. art. 19, 10 U.S.C. § 819 (special court-martial has jurisdiction to try
persons subject to the UCMJ for "any noncapital offense made punishable by [the UCMJ]").
The field of potential UCMJ offenses is quite broad. Some of the many offenses that may be
tried by court-martial are specifically identified within the UCMJ. See generally id. arts. 77-
133, 10 U.S.C. §§ 877-933 (specific enumeration of crimes). Courts-martial may also
punish "all disorders and neglects to the prejudice of good order and discipline in the armed
forces" as well as any "conduct of a nature to bring discredit upon the armed forces." See id.
art. 134, 10 U.S.C. § 934. Additionally, each federal non-capital offense is incorporated into
the UCMJ as a military crime by the UCMJ's "general article." See id. art. 134, 10 U.S.C.
§ 934 ("Though not specifically mentioned in [the UCMJ] .... crimes and offenses not
capital, of which persons subject to [the UCMJ] may be guilty, shall be taken cognizance of
by a... court-martial .. ").
13 Offenses by military personnel on active duty are within the subject matter jurisdiction
of courts-martial, regardless of the situs of the offense. See Solorio v. United States, 483
U.S. 435, 440-41, 450-51 (1987) ("In an unbroken line of decisions from 1866 [until
O'Callahan v. Parker in 1969], this Court interpreted the Constitution as conditioning the
proper exercise of court-martial jurisdiction over an offense on one factor: the military status
of the accused."). The significance of the "active duty" status of the defendant is discussed
infra text accompanying note 16.
14 The subject matter jurisdiction of a court-martial depends on the status of the
defendant as a person on military active duty when the crime was committed, not upon the
victim's civilian or military status. See Loving v. United States, 517 U.S. 748, 751, 774
(1996) (affirming sentence of death imposed upon soldier by general court-martial (GCM)
for murder of two civilian taxicab drivers); Solorio, 483 U.S. at 449 (rejecting the service-
connection doctrine under which subject matter jurisdiction of courts-martial depended on
such factors as the relation of the victim of the crime to the military community).
15 For many offenses by military members, concurrent jurisdiction exists between courts-
martial and federal, state, or foreign courts. See, e.g., United States v. Irwin, 39 M.J. 1062,
1063 n.2 (A. Ct. Crim. App. 1994); United States v. Dutil, 14 M.J. 707, 709 (N-M. Ct. Crim.
App. 1982); cf MANUAL FOR COURTS-MARTIAL, UNITED STATES, 11-10 (RCM 201(d) & app.
3) (2005 ed.) [hereinafter MCM]. The constitutional prohibition against double jeopardy is
not implicated except when the later jeopardy is accomplished under authority of the same
sovereign as the first jeopardy. United States v. Wheeler, 40 M.J. 242, 245 (C.A.A.F. 1994).
Thus, trial of the military defendant both by court-martial and in state court for the same act
is constitutionally permissible. United States v. Hutchinson, 49 M.J. 6, 6-7 (C.A.A.F. 1998);
United States v. Schneider, 38 M.J. 387, 390-92 (C.A.A.F. 1993). Likewise, a soldier
previously prosecuted in the court of another country is not protected by the constitutional
double jeopardy provision from prosecution before a United States court-martial, although
military departmental policies generally disfavor such repeated prosecution. See United
States v. Miller, 16 M.J. 169, 174-75 & n.9 (C.A.A.F. 1983) (implying that even if
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member of the armed forces in an "active duty" status, that person may be
brought before a court-martial to stand trial for virtually any conceivable
felony offense. 16
Thus, military trials regularly adjudicate serious felonies such as
internet child pornography, child sexual abuse, rape, and murder, and not
just minor disciplinary infractions peculiar to military life, such as AWOL
or disrespect to superiors.' 7  Further, courts-martial frequently impose
serious sentences, including substantial periods of imprisonment and the
death penalty, on those found guilty of felonies.
1 8
Skeptics may question whether the procedures followed in military
jury trials are fair enough toward the accused that any civilian jurisdiction
would even consider adopting any of their features. My own experience as
a military trial judge, presiding over hundreds of felony trials by military
jury during a recent ten-year period, leads me to conclude that the military
jury trial, while no more perfect than any other human institution, is a
fundamentally fair and sound process for determining criminal culpability.19
conviction by a Korean court had been final, that would not preclude court-martial because
both nations had concurrent jurisdiction); United States v. Green, 14 M.J. 461, 464 n.3, 473
(C.A.A.F. 1983) (ruling that prosecution in a British court did not preclude court-martial);
United States v. Frostell, 13 M.J. 680, 681-82 (N-M. Ct. Crim. App. 1982) (finding that
conviction by a Japanese court did not preclude court-martial); United States v. Stokes, 12
M.J. 229, 232 (C.M.A. 1982) (concluding that conviction by a Spanish court did not
preclude court-martial).
By contrast, however, since trials before courts-martial and trials in United States
magistrate court are both prosecuted in the name of the United States, a soldier cannot be
prosecuted before both for the same offense. See United States v. Chavez, 6 M.J. 615, 619
(A.C.M.R. 1978).
16 The term "on active duty" essentially refers to the status of a soldier or sailor as a full-
time member of the armed services (as opposed to one in a reserve military component who,
while perhaps drilling on a part-time basis, has not been called to return to active service, or
a person who is an officer on the retired list). See 10 U.S.C. § 101(d)(l). The reach of "in
personam" jurisdiction in military criminal law is somewhat broader than simply the
category of service members actually on active duty, but persons in the other categories are
only infrequently subjected to trial by courts-martial. See UCMJ art. 2, 10 U.S.C. § 802.
17 E.g., United States v. Miller, 63 M.J. 452, 454 (C.A.A.F. 2006) (internet child
pornography); United States v. Thompson, 59 M.J. 432, 432 (C.A.A.F. 2004) (indecent acts
or liberties with a child); United States v. Gray, 51 M.J. 1 (C.A.A.F. 1999) (two murders,
three rapes, forcible sodomy, two robberies, and burglary).
18 E.g., United States v. Shelton, 62 M.J. I (C.A.A.F. 2005) (murder, larceny, and
kidnapping); United States v. Kreutzer, 61 M.J. 293 (C.A.A.F. 2005) (death penalty for
premeditated murder and eighteen counts of attempted murder); United States v. Gray, 51
M.J. I (C.A.A.F. 1999) (two murders, three rapes, forcible sodomy, two robberies, and
burglary); United States v. Loving, 41 M.J. 213 (C.A.A.F. 1994), affd, 517 U.S. 748 (1996)
(death penalty for premeditated murder, attempted murder, and robbery).
19 The author served as a military "circuit judge" (or trial judge) from July 1992 through
June 2002, and he presided over trials by court-martial conducted at more than twenty
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More significant than my own opinion is that offered by one of America's
most renowned trial lawyers, F. Lee Bailey, in 1996: "If I had an innocent
client, I would want that person to be tried in a military court[, where] the
accused receives a full and fair trial of the facts.",
20
Of course, the military criminal law system has always had its
detractors.21 In 1969, the Supreme Court expressed serious concern about
the adequacy of due process within the court-martial system. 22 In large part
based on its reasoning that "military tribunals have not been and probably
never can be constituted in such [a] way that they can have the same kind of
qualifications that the Constitution has deemed essential to fair trials of
civilians, 23 O 'Callahan v. Parker ruled that courts-martial could only reach
criminal offenses by service members if such offenses were "service
connected. 24  The Court decided that the allegation that a soldier had
broken into a downtown Honolulu hotel room and there attempted to rape a
young civilian girl while he was on an evening pass away from his military
post, in peacetime, 25 was not service-connected and, therefore, could not be
tried by a court-martial.26
However, in the 1978 case of Solorio v. United States, 27 the Court
rejected that narrow view of the jurisdiction of military courts and held that
the subject matter jurisdiction of courts-martial extends to any offense
allegedly committed by military personnel while in "active duty" status.
28
Solorio expressed no criticism of the fundamental fairness of military trials,
different military posts at locations from Alaska to Panama.
20 Kathleen A. Duignan, Military Justice: Not an Oxymoron, 43 FED. LAW., Feb. 1996, at
22 (quoting F. Lee Bailey). Clearly, this was no casual comment by Mr. Bailey, since he
expressed much the same opinion some twenty years earlier after successfully defending
Captain Ernest Medina at a 1971 general court-martial that acquitted Medina of all charges
related to the My Lai massacre. F. LEE BAILEY, FOR THE DEFENSE 38 (1976) ("The fact is, if
I were innocent, I would far prefer to stand trial before a military tribunal governed by the
Uniform Code of Military Justice than by any court, state or federal.").
2 1 Nothing has ever quite captured the vehemence of those critics like the title of this
book: ROBERT SHERRILL, MILITARY JUSTICE IS TO JUSTICE AS MILITARY MUSIC IS TO MUSIC
(1970).
22 See O'Callahan v. Parker, 395 U.S. 258, 262-63 (1969), overruled by Solorio v. United
States, 483 U.S. 435, 436 (1987).
23 Id. at 262-63. The O'Callahan decision also included this memorable comparison: "A
civilian trial ... is held in an atmosphere conducive to the protection of individual rights,
while a military trial is marked by the age-old manifest destiny of retributive justice." Id. at
266.
24 Id. at 272-73.
25 Id. at 259-60, 273-74.
26 Id. at 274.
27 483 U.S. 435, 436 (1987).
28 Id. at 450-51.
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and the Court specifically overruled the O'Callahan decision. 9 In fact,
since 1969, the Court has neither questioned the fairness of the military trial
nor overturned any court-martial conviction; in each of the eight military
cases where it granted certiorari, the Court affirmed the military
conviction, 30 including one case that directly challenged the imposition of
the death sentence by a court-martial.3'
In Weiss v. United States, the Court affirmed several court-martial
convictions, rejecting the defendants' assertion that a trial by a court-martial
violates the Fifth Amendment's Due Process Clause because military
judges who preside over courts-martial are not sufficiently independent to
guarantee a fair trial.3a In holding that the lack of a fixed term of office for
military judges does not undermine the due process to which a military
defendant is entitled,33 the Court clearly applied the "elementary [principle]
that 'a fair trial in a fair tribunal is a basic requirement of due process'
with equal force to military trials.34 Next, the Court reasoned that "[a]
necessary component of a fair trial is an impartial judge.' 35 Thoroughly
reviewing the court-martial system's many safeguards aimed at preserving
the independence of military judges,3 6 the Court concluded that "the
applicable provisions of the UCMJ, and corresponding regulations, by
insulating military judges from the effects of command influence,
sufficiently preserve judicial impartiality so as to satisfy the Due Process
Clause. 3 7 Moreover, as the Supreme Court recognized in Weiss, the Court
of Appeals for the Armed Forces3 8 has demonstrated its willingness to
overturn any court-martial conviction that is reached without the
fundamental fairness or due process to which a defendant is entitled under
the Constitution.39
29 Id. at 436.
30 The eight cases in which the United States Supreme Court granted certiorari and
directly reviewed military convictions are summarized in 2 GILLIGAN & LEDERER, supra note
4, at 550-51 & n.259.
31 Loving v. United States, 517 U.S. 748 (1996) (upholding the non-statutory aggravating
factors prescribed by the President as Commander-in-Chief which a court-martial must use
to evaluate whether to impose the death penalty).
32 Weiss v. United States, 510 U.S. 163, 181 (1994).
31 Id. at 179.
14 Id. at 178.
31 Id. at 178.
36 See id. at 179-81.
37 Id. at 179.
38 UCMJ art. 67, 10 U.S.C. § 867 (2000). Prior to 1994, this Article I court was named
the United States Court of Military Appeals.
31 See Weiss, 510 U.S. at 181 (observing that the Court of Military Appeals, predecessor
of the Court of Appeals for the Armed Forces, "has demonstrated its vigilance in checking
2006]
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However, this Article does not undertake a general defense of the
entire military criminal law system or attempt to demonstrate that the
UCMJ provides the military defendant the same procedural fairness at trial
that state or federal criminal justice systems generally afford American
citizens. 40 The adequacy of due process within the military criminal justice
system has been debated for years in academic circles and in Congress;
adding to that huge body of commentary is beyond the more modest
objective of this Article.4'
Instead, the thesis here is that several specific aspects of military jury
practice satisfy contemporary notions of due process for civilian defendants
any attempts to exert improper influence over military judges"); United States v. Harris, 61
M.J. 391, 398 (C.A.A.F. 2005) (setting aside a plea of guilty as improvident and granting a
new trial); United States v. Rollins, 61 M.J. 338, 343 (C.A.A.F. 2005) (setting aside findings
of guilt in part because they were based upon faulty instructions to jury); United States v.
Sonego, 61 M.J. 1, 4 (C.A.A.F. 2005) (ordering corrective action where the accused made a
colorable claim ofjuror dishonesty during voir dire); United States v. Daniels, 60 M.J. 69, 72
(C.A.A.F. 2004) (setting aside a conviction resting upon evidence derived from a warrantless
search in violation of Fourth Amendment); United States v. Scheffer, 44 M.J. 442, 444, 448-
49 (C.A.A.F. 1996) (holding that a per se evidentiary rule preventing the accused from
attempting to show reliability of exculpatory polygraph results violated the Sixth
Amendment right to present defense), rev'd, 523 U.S. 303 (1998); United States v.
Matthews, 16 M.J. 354 (C.M.A. 1983) (setting aside a death sentence due to Constitutional
defects in then-existing UCMJ & MCM procedures under which a GCM adjudged death
penalty in the 1979 murder case), superseded by changes to MCM, supra note 15, at 11-130-
11-132 (R.C.M. 1004), as recognized in United States v. Curtis, 32 M.J. 252, 257 (C.M.A.
1991) ("President Reagan amended the Manual for Courts-Martial to provide a new
procedure for capital cases. Exec. Order No. 12,460, 49 Fed. Reg. 3169 (1984) .... The
death penalty procedure authorized by the President in January 1984 became RCM 1004 in
the Manual for Courts-Martial, United States, 1984.").
40 Many scholars remain critical of the hybrid nature of the UCMJ as both a system of
criminal justice and a mechanism for commanders to enforce the discipline essential to
armed forces. See, e.g., Jonathan Turley, Tribunals and Tribulations: The Antithetical
Elements of Military Governance in a Madisonian Democracy, 70 GEO. WASH. L. REV. 649,
673-74 (2002) (calling for sharp curtailment of a separate criminal justice system for
members of the military). For an extensive bibliography of commentary calling for reform
or abolition of the military criminal law system, see DAVID A. SCHLUETER, MILITARY
CRIMINAL JUSTICE: PRACTICE AND PROCEDURE 41-52 (5th ed. 1999 & Supp. 2002).
41 One of the salient issues in that debate is whether to change the historic method of
military juror selection to some form of random selection of personnel for jury duty. Instead
of a random process, senior commanders select the court members by name from among
their own military subordinates, as has been the American military custom since before our
Nation's independence. This selection mechanism has been roundly criticized. See Turley,
supra note 40, at 673-74 (2002). For a listing of numerous other articles criticizing the
command selection of military jurors, and for a spirited defense of the current UCMJ
provisions concerning military juror selection, see Christopher W. Behan, Don't Tug on
Superman's Cape: In Defense of Convening Authority Selection and Appointment of Court-
Martial Panel Members, 176 MIL. L. REV. 190, 193-94 & n.25 (2003).
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and would enhance the reliability and efficiency of those trials, if these
features were adopted for use in state criminal trials.42 Accordingly, fair-
minded observers ought to consider the relevance of these specific military
trial features to state criminal trial procedures.
II. UNDERSTANDING TRIAL PROCEDURES USED BY THE COURT-MARTIAL
Any discussion of how military jury practice differs from that found in
many state systems requires an understanding of the structure and
proceedings of a military trial. Federal law, and specifically the UCMJ,
requires that the courts-martial conducted by any of the armed forces
43
conform to certain fundamental trial procedures.44 The UCMJ provides the
authority of the military trial judge as the presiding officer 45 of the court-
martial, the procedures for challenging the judge and military jurors,46 and
the procedures for reaching the verdict and the sentence.47 While the UCMJ
leaves other important procedural details of the military trial process to the
President's discretion,48 the UCMJ nonetheless requires that such executive
directives apply uniformly among the armed forces. 49 The President, by
executive order, has provided those uniform supplementary procedures in
the Manual for Courts-Martial (MCM). 50 The combined effect of the
UCMJ and the MCM is that the jury trial practices used by each of the
42 The Supreme Court has interpreted the minimum "due process" required of the states
by the Fourteenth Amendment somewhat differently than that required in federal criminal
trials by the Sixth Amendment. See discussion infra Section III.C. 1.
43 The armed forces include the Army, Navy, Marine Corps, and Air Force, as well as the
Coast Guard. 10 U.S.C. § 101(a)(4).
44 See UCMJ arts. 36-54, 10 U.S.C. §§ 836-854 (providing uniform procedures for trials
by general and special courts-martial).
41 Id. arts. 26, 39, 40, 51(b)-(c), 10 U.S.C. §§ 826, 839, 840, 851(b)-(c).
46 Id. art. 41, 10 U.S.C. § 841.
41 Id. arts. 51, 52, 10 U.S.C. §§ 851, 852.
48 Id. art. 36(a), 10 U.S.C. § 836(a) ("[T]rial... procedures, including modes of
proof, ... may be prescribed by the President by regulations which shall, so far as he
considers practicable, apply the principles of law and the rules of evidence generally
recognized in the trial of criminal cases in the United States district courts, but which may
not be contrary to or inconsistent with this chapter.").
41 Id. art. 36(b), 10 U.S.C. § 836(b) ("[R]egulations made under this article shall be
uniform insofar as practicable.").
50 See MCM, supra note 15, at preface & app. 25. Section II of the MCM contains a
series of procedural rules applicable to courts-martial that "govern the procedures and
punishments in all courts-martial." MCM, supra note 15, § 11-1 (describing the Rules for
Courts-Martial (R.C.M.) that are contained in the MCM at Section 11-1 through 11-182)
[hereinafter MCM, supra note 15, R.C.M. - ]. Thus, by executive order, the Rules for




several armed forces are the same. Thus, while this Article discusses
military jury practices within the context of an Army general court-
martial,5' the same features apply in any military trial, whether the
defendant is a sailor, airman, marine, or coastguardsman.
51 For clarity of discussion, this Article concentrates on the procedures of the GCM, or
the felony level military trial, and not on those of the special court-martial (SPCM), or the
misdemeanor-level trial. The GCM is the only type of court-martial authorized to impose
sentences that include confinement for more than one year, dishonorable discharge, or the
death penalty. See UCMJ art. 18, 10 U.S.C. § 818; cf id. art. 19, 10 U.S.C. § 819 (limiting
punishment by SPCM). By contrast to the GCM, the SPCM "might well be thought of as a
'misdemeanor' level court-martial." Barry, supra note 3, at 77.
In addition to its limited sentencing authority, the SPCM differs from the GCM in several
other important respects. By comparison to the senior commanders who are empowered to
convene the GCM, somewhat lower-ranking commanders may convene the SPCM. See
UCMJ art. 23, 10 U.S.C. § 823; MCM, supra note 15, R.C.M. 504. Further, the SPCM may
operate with as few as three voting members, while the GCM must have at least five.
Compare UCMJ art. 16(2), 10 U.S.C. § 816(2); MCM, supra note 15, R.C.M. 501(a)(2),
with UCMJ art. 16(1), 10 U.S.C. § 816(1); MCM, supra note 15, R.C.M. 501(a)(1).
This Article's summary of the general steps involved in the prosecution of a felony in
military court concentrates on the scenario for a GCM because it most closely corresponds to
the felony trial in civilian American jurisdictions. However, all of the particular features of
military jury practice discussed in the context of the GCM in Section III of this Article, infra,
apply equally to the SPCM military jury, except that a SPCM ordinarily includes fewer
jurors than a GCM.
Any attempt to be both brief and technically accurate while summarizing the operation of
the GCM and the SPCM at the same time is complicated by several factors.
First, the SPCM occur in two species, the "BCD-SPCM" and the "non-BCD-SPCM."
Most SPCM are convened, or created, with the authority to adjudge a bad conduct discharge
(BCD) or as much as one year of confinement as part of the sentence, and consequently have
some additional procedural safeguards that make these so-called "BCD-SPCM" more like
the GCM. Specifically, these BCD-SPCM must, like every GCM, include a military judge
(except in narrowly defined exigencies), and the government must prepare a verbatim, as
opposed to summarized, record of all its trial sessions. UCMJ art. 19, 10 U.S.C. § 819;
MCM, supra note 15, R.C.M. 201(f)(2)(B)(ii). The UCMJ permits other SPCM to proceed
without a military judge or verbatim record, but such courts do not have the power to impose
a BCD or more than six months of confinement in the sentence. See UCMJ art. 19, 10
U.S.C. § 819; MCM, supra note 15, R.C.M. 201(f)(2)(B)(ii).
Yet another complication is that, as a matter of departmental policies, commanders in the
Air Force, Navy, and Marine Corps do not utilize the non-BCD-SPCM, and Army policy
requires that a trial judge preside over every SPCM, even those of the species where a
military judge is not statutorily required. See United States v. Llewellyn, 32 M.J. 803, 805
n.2 (A.C.M.R. 1991) ("[T]his court is not aware of any cases which have been tried in the
Army without a military judge since enactment of the 1968 amendments.").
In short, this arcanum may be reduced to a more comprehensible discussion by
concentrating on the GCM (or felony trial), while emphasizing that the features of military
jury practice that are the focus of this Article, infra Section III, apply equally to both felony-
level military trials (by GCM) and misdemeanor-level military trials (by SPCM).
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When a senior commander considers that the allegations of criminal
conduct 2 against a soldier are serious enough to warrant consideration by a
military court with authority to impose felony-level punishment, that senior
commander designates an experienced officer from within the command to
investigate the allegations and then report back in writing.53  This
52 Any person subject to the jurisdiction of the UCMJ is entitled to bring an allegation
that a soldier has violated the UCMJ, and may do so simply by swearing under oath to her
belief in the allegation. UCMJ art. 30, 10 U.S.C. § 830; MCM, supra note 15, R.C.M. 307.
However, in practice most formal charges are initiated by the accused soldier's immediate
commander. See MCM, supra note 15, R.C.M. 301(b) and accompanying "Discussion."
This lowest level commander, normally the company commander, may have personal
knowledge of the misconduct, or she may have received a report of the misconduct from
others (for example, the victim, subordinate noncommissioned officers, civilian police
authorities, or military law enforcement authorities). See id. R.C.M. 301. When the
immediate commander lacks personal knowledge of the offense, she will make an informal
preliminary investigation. See id. R.C.M. 303. Depending on her assessment of the
situation, she may terminate the matter, address it herself through the limited disciplinary
sanctions at her disposal, or "prefer" a formal criminal charge. See id. R.C.M. 306, 307.
The act of "preferral" is the formal initiation of a criminal allegation under the UCMJ for
eventual adjudication by a court-martial. See id. R.C.M. 307. Ordinarily, the immediate
commander who prefers a charge is not of sufficient stature in the military chain of
command to "forward" the charge directly to a court-martial for trial. Thus, she will forward
the charge to a more senior commander in her chain of command with a recommendation
that a more senior commander "refer" the charge to a court-martial. See id. R.C.M.
306(c)(5) & 401(c). As the matter is passed up the chain of command, with each
commander recommending in writing the specific type of court-martial or other disposition
considered appropriate, commanders at successively higher levels have a somewhat broader
range of options available to them. See id. R.C.M. 401-404 (describing options for
commanders at different levels in the chain of command). Generally, the lowest-level
commander with authority to refer the charge to a GCM is an officer commanding an
organization at the level of an Army combat division (a formation of some 10,000 to 16,000
soldiers) or a significant Army installation. See UCMJ art. 22(a)(5), 10 U.S.C. § 822(a)(5).
Thus, most officers who can refer charges to a GCM are commanding generals with the rank
of brigadier or major general (wearing at least one or two stars). Similarly, in the other
services, officers with GCM authority are those who command larger air wings or naval
formations, sizeable independent marine units, or significant installations. See id.
art. 22(a)(5)-(7), 10 U.S.C. § 822(a)(5)-(7).
53 See id. art. 32(a), 10 U.S.C. § 832(a); MCM, supra note 15, R.C.M. 405. The "Article
32 investigation" is sometimes regarded as "'the military equivalent of a grand jury,"
United States v. Bell, 44 M.J. 403, 406 (C.A.A.F. 1996) (quoting United States v. Nickerson,
27 M.J. 30, 31-32 (C.M.A. 1988)), but there are substantial distinctions between the military
Article 32 investigation and a civilian grand jury. On the one hand, if the investigating
officer recommends against sending the case to trial, that recommendation is not binding on
the senior commander, see 2 GILLIGAN & LEDERER, supra note 4, at 352 ("[The]
recommendation of the investigating officer is advisory only and may be ignored with
impunity."), whereas a civilian district attorney could not proceed to trial without a "true
bill" from a grand jury or a judicial substitute. See, e.g., U.S. CONST. amend. V; cf
O'Callahan v. Parker, 395 U.S. 258, 262 (1969) (noting that one of the "fundamental
differences" between UCMJ proceedings and prosecution by civilian authorities is that only
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procedure, known as an "Article 32" investigation, consists of a preliminary
hearing at which the accused and his legal counsel are present.54 During the
course of this hearing, the investigating officer takes testimony under oath
from witnesses for both the prosecution and the defense who are reasonably
available, and considers all other relevant evidence reasonably available. 55
After considering this evidence, the investigating officer recommends
whatever disposition he considers appropriate, including that the charges
should be dropped or that the allegations do not merit a court-martial. 6 The
senior commander is required to consider the investigating officer's
recommendations and to consult with his senior military legal advisor (the
staff judge advocate) before deciding how to proceed.57 Assuming that the
senior commander does not elect to dismiss the charges or proceed with
some less severe mechanism, he will refer the accusations to a general
court-martial.
58
in the latter does the accused have the "benefit of an indictment by a grand jury"), overruled
by Solorio v. United States, 483 U.S. 435, 436 (1987). On the other hand, the military
defendant and his defense counsel have substantially greater rights to participate in an
Article 32 investigation than is customary in a grand jury proceeding. See MCM, supra note
15, R.C.M. 405(f)-(h). For example, during an Article 32 investigation, the military
defendant is entitled to observe the presentation of all evidence to the investigating officer,
make a statement on his own behalf, retain the assistance of defense counsel throughout the
investigation, cross-examine any witness called before the investigation, initiate compulsory
process to bring reasonably available witnesses before the investigation, register objections
to evidence considered or to other steps taken by the investigating officer, and present
arguments to the investigating officer before the latter makes his report. United States v.
Garcia, 59 M.J. 447, 450-51 (C.A.A.F. 2004) (observing that at an Article 32 investigation,
"the accused has the right to be represented by counsel, to cross-examine witnesses, and 'to
present anything he may desire in his own behalf" (quoting UCMJ art. 32, 10 U.S.C.
§ 832)); MCM, supra note 15, R.C.M. 405(f)-(h). As a result, military appellate decisions
recognize that the Article 32 investigation provides the military defendant a significant
vehicle for discovery of the prosecution's evidence. See Garcia, 59 M.J. at 451 ("The
Article 32 investigation 'operates as a discovery proceeding for the accused' and stands as a
bulwark against baseless charges." (quoting United States v. Samuels, 10 C.M.A. 206, 212
(C.M.A. 1959))). The accused may also object to the particular investigating officer on
grounds that he or she is not impartial. See United States v. Whitt, 21 M.J. 658, 660
(A.C.M.R. 1985); United States v. Davis, 20 M.J. 61, 66 (C.M.A. 1985) (Cox, J.,
concurring).
54 See UCMJ art. 32, 10 U.S.C. § 832; MCM, supra note 15, R.C.M. 405(f).
55 See MCM, supra note 15, R.C.M. 405(g). The scope of permissible evidence at the
Article 32 investigation is somewhat broader than the Military Rules of Evidence that apply
during trial. See id. R.C.M. 405(i).
56 See id. R.C.M. 4050)(2)(I).
7 See UCMJ art. 34(a), 10 U.S.C. § 834(a); MCM, supra note 15, R.C.M. 406,
407(a)(6).
58 See MCM, supra note 15, R.C.M. 407(a)(6), 601. A GCM is a military court created
for a temporary period, comprised of named individuals serving as members (or jurors), and
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During the court-martial proceeding, the defendant is represented by
military or civilian defense counsel, or both, as she chooses. 59 The United
States is represented by a military prosecuting attorney, called the trial
counsel.60 Counsel for both the defense and the prosecution must be
members of a state bar or the bar of a federal court.61
The GCM itself has two essential components: a military judge and a
panel of voting "members. 62  The military judge is a commissioned
military officer certified as qualified for judicial duties by the Judge
Advocate General of that service and must be a member of the bar.63 The
military judge presides over the trial proceedings, exercising those judicial
functions familiar to any observer of the American legal system.64 Thus, he
charged with deciding guilt or innocence in particular cases referred to it, and, for those
accused found guilty, the appropriate sentence. See 1 GILLIGAN & LEDERER, supra note 4, at
511-12; 2 id. at 373; SCHLUETER, supra note 40, at 335; Behan, supra note 41, at 191.
59 MCM, supra note 15, R.C.M. 506. Military defense counsel, even a military attorney
requested by name (provided she is reasonably available to participate), is provided without
charge to the accused soldier, regardless of the defendant's financial situation or rank. See
UCMJ art. 38(b), 10 U.S.C. § 838(b); MCM, supra note 15, R.C.M. 506(a); United States v.
Blaney, 50 M.J. 533, 541-42 (A.F. Ct. Crim. App. 1999) (implying that an accused who was
serving as an Air Force major was entitled to ask for a particular Marine Corps attorney to
represent him, but had waived that right, without mention of any financial inability of the
accused to retain civilian counsel of choice).
60 MCM, supra note 15, R.C.M. 502(d)(5).
61 Id. R.C.M. 502(d)(1), (3).
62 Id. R.C.M. 501. The qualifications and responsibilities of the military members (or
jurors) are discussed infra note 72 and accompanying text.
63 See UCMJ art. 26(b), 10 U.S.C. § 826(b).
64 See United States v. Graf, 35 M.J. 450, 465 (C.M.A. 1992) (UCMJ "contemplates that
a military judge be a real judge as commonly understood in the American legal tradition");
MCM, supra note 15, R.C.M. 801 (describing the military judge's responsibilities). In
practice, military judges are generally experienced, senior military attorneys with substantial
criminal trial experience as either defense counsel or prosecutors. Additionally, they
generally have previously supervised military legal offices, and they must qualify for the
assignment by satisfactorily completing a specialized "qualifying course" that prepares the
new military judges of all of the armed forces. Military judges then typically serve for
several years in that capacity.
Each of the military departments has a trial judiciary that is organized in geographical
circuits, so that judges are available to preside over courts-martial wherever needed.
Although the number of officers assigned to military judge duty varies from year to year
depending on the number of military personnel serving on active duty, and hence on the
corresponding trial case load, as of 2006, the Army trial judiciary, the Air Force trial
judiciary, and the combined Navy-Marine Corps trial judiciary each had about twenty full-
time military judges. Most of these judges travel throughout their circuits presiding over
trials at various posts or overseas bases. It is becoming more common for the chief judges of
the separate service trial judiciaries to lend and borrow trial judges across service lines when
necessary to handle the trial docket at a particular locale in an efficient manner.
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controls the docketing, pace, and course of the trial proceedings.65 The
military judge rules on any motions or other procedural issues raised by the
prosecution or defense and instructs the voting members on the substantive
and procedural legal principles applicable to the case.66  A number of
safeguards insulate military judges from inappropriate pressure by senior
commanders who may have an interest in the prosecution of soldiers under
their command.67 Significantly, military judges are not supervised by, and
do not report to, field commanders; rather, they are accountable to the Judge
Advocates General of their respective military services,68 who, as the
Supreme Court has noted, "have no interest in the outcome of a particular
court-martial.
' 69
The "members" of the court-martial (or military jurors) perform
functions very much like the jurors in any civilian criminal trial: they are
responsible for the determination of guilt or innocence, and, when
necessary, an appropriate sentence. 70  All military jurors are military
65 See MCM, supra note 15, R.C.M. 801. The rulings and instructions of the military
judge are binding on the court-martial's voting members (or jury), just as are the decisions of
a civilian trial judge in any American trial system. United States v. Hardy, 46 M.J. 67, 72-73
(C.A.A.F. 1997) (military judge rules on all interlocutory questions and all questions of law
raised during a court-martial and instructs members on questions of law and procedure
which arise; such rulings by military judge are "final").
66 See MCM, supra note 15, R.C.M. 801; United States v. Hawks, 19 M.J. 736, 737 (A.F.
Ct. Crim. App. 1984) (the military judge is the sole source of law for the court members,
who may not consult any other source of the law during the trial; members are required to
follow the military judge's instructions as to the law); DEP'T OF THE ARMY, MILITARY
JUDGES' BENCHBOOK (PAMPHLET 27-9) 2-5 (2002) [hereinafter MILITARY JUDGES'
BENCHBOOK].
67 See Weiss v. United States, 510 U.S. 163, 179 (1994) (holding that, although military
judges do not have tenure provided by statute, "the applicable provisions of the UCMJ, and
corresponding regulations, by insulating military judges from the effects of command
influence, sufficiently preserve judicial impartiality so as to satisfy the Due Process
Clause").
68 Military judges are directly responsible only to the service's Judge Advocate General
for their assignments for duty and for any evaluation of their "effectiveness, fitness, or
efficiency" as a judge. See UCMJ art. 26(c), 10 U.S.C. § 826(c); MCM, supra note 15,
R.C.M. 502(c). Correspondingly, the service Judge Advocates General are not appointed to
such position by the respective Secretaries of the three military departments, but instead are
appointed by the President, by and with the consent of the Senate. See 10 U.S.C. §§ 3037(a),
5148(b), 8037(a).
61 Weiss, 510 U.S. at 180 ("[W]e believe this structure helps protect [the military judge's
judicial] independence."); United States v. Norfleet, 53 M.J. 262, 268 (C.A.A.F. 2000)
(observing that arrangements for the separate military trial judiciary are designed to
"enhance the independence of judicial decisionmaking by military judges").
70 See MCM, supra note 15, R.C.M. 502(a)(2) ("The members of a court-martial shall
determine whether the accused is proved guilty and, if necessary, adjudge a proper sentence,
based on the evidence and in accordance with the instructions of the military judge.").
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personnel on active duty,71 and, like civilian jurors, they are ordinarily lay
persons rather than lawyers.72
However, unlike jurors for civilian criminal trials, military jurors are
not randomly selected for that duty. Instead, military jurors are designated
to participate in a particular court-martial by the same senior commander
who referred the allegations to the court-martial for trial.73 The senior
commander generally selects the members of a court-martial from
personnel available within the large organization or unit that he
71 See UCMJ art. 25(a)-(d), 10 U.S.C. § 825(a)-(c) (describing the persons eligible to
serve as members of a court-martial as commissioned officers, warrant officers, and enlisted
members, who (for each category) are "on active duty"); MCM, supra note 15, R.C.M.
502(a)(1) ("Each member shall be on active duty with the armed forces .. ").
72 The officer who convenes, or constitutes, the court-martial is charged to "detail as
members thereof such members of the armed forces as, in his opinion, are best qualified for
the duty by reason of age, education, training, experience, length of service, and judicial
temperament." UCMJ art. 25(d)(2), 10 U.S.C. § 825(d)(2); MCM, supra note 15, RCM
502(a)(1). To be eligible for duty as a member of a court-martial, the individual must be on
active duty in the armed forces as an enlisted member, a warrant officer, or a commissioned
officer, and he ordinarily must be of at least equal rank or grade to the defendant; no legal
qualifications are specified. See UCMJ art. 25, 10 U.S.C. § 825.
The accused at a court-martial has no right to have a jury of his peers, a representative
cross-section of the community, or randomly chosen members; however, the military
defendant does have a right to members who are fair and impartial. United States v. Dowty,
60 M.J. 163, 169 (C.A.A.F. 2004); see United States v. Kirkland, 53 M.J. 22, 24 (C.A.A.F.
2000) ("While the military defendant does not enjoy a Sixth Amendment right to a trial by
'impartial jury,' he or she does have a right to 'members who are fair and impartial."'
(quoting United States v. Roland, 50 M.J. 66, 68 (A.F. Ct. Crim. App. 1999))); United States
v. Rockwood, 52 M.J. 98, 105-06 (C.A.A.F. 1999) ("The parties are 'entitled to court
members who will keep an open mind and decide the case based on evidence presented in
court and the law as announced by the military judge."').
The terms "education" and "training" have never been interpreted by the military courts
as referring to any required legal education or training. In several cases, however, military
defendants challenged members for cause because of training or experience related to the
law, suggesting that such legal training created substantial doubt as to the "fairness and
impartiality" of the prospective juror under the MCM, supra note 15, R.C.M. 912(f)(1)(N).
See United States v. Evans, 55 M.J. 732, 746-47 (N-M. Ct. Crim. App. 2001) (military judge
did not abuse discretion in denying challenge for cause based on claim that member recently
attended Legal Officer's Course taught by the Naval Justice School); United States v.
Powell, 55 M.J. 633, 645-46 (A.F. Ct. Crim. App. 2001) (in prosecution of Air Force
Academy cadet at GCM, military judge did not abuse discretion in denying challenge for
cause against a panel member who taught and enforced the cadet honor code).
71 See UCMJ art. 25(d)(2), 10 U.S.C. § 825(d)(2); MCM, supra note 15, R.C.M. 502(a),
503(a)(1). In practice, most senior commanders in the Army, Navy, and Marine Corps select
"standing panels" for the posts or organizations under their command to hear any cases
referred to that particular court-martial during a period of several months; in other words,
those commanders do not select a different "jury" for every new case sent to trial.
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commands.74 Collectively, the voting members of a particular court-martial
are generally referred to as the "panel., 75 The members of the panel are
commissioned officers, warrant officers, enlisted soldiers, or some
combination thereof; the particular composition of the panel depends on the
rank of the defendant and, in part, on his or her preference.76 When the
court-martial convenes to begin a particular trial, the members are subject to
voir dire and challenges by both the defense and the prosecution," and the
military judge rules on any challenges against members. The parties are
allowed an unlimited number of challenges for cause against members,78
and additionally each party is allowed one peremptory challenge.79
74 See MCM, supra note 15, R.C.M. 503(a)(3). The senior commander may request
military personnel from outside her own command or even from another armed force to
serve as a member on a court-martial that she convenes, provided their own commanders
make those individuals available.
75 See, e.g., United States v. Haney, 64 M.J. 101, 102 (C.A.A.F. 2006) ("A court-martial
panel of officer and enlisted members convicted Appellant, contrary to his pleas ...."); 2
GILLIGAN & LEDERER, supra note 4, at 16-17.
76 See MCM, supra note 15, R.C.M. 502(a). The UCMJ generally requires that members
of a court-martial be of at least the same rank as the accused soldier. UCMJ art. 25(d)(1), 10
U.S.C. § 825(d)(1). When a commissioned or warrant officer is on trial, the members are all
officers. See id. art. 25(a)-(c), 10 U.S.C. § 825(a)-(c). However, a defendant who is an
enlisted soldier may demand that at least one-third of the members who comprise the panel
that will decide his guilt or his sentence come from the enlisted ranks. See id. art. 25(c)(1),
10 U.S.C. § 825(c)(1); MCM, supra note 15, R.C.M. 502(a)(1)(C), 503(a)(2). In practice, an
enlisted defendant who makes such a demand often ends up with a panel that has more
enlisted jurors than the minimum one-third of the panel. In the event that the enlisted jurors
felt the defendant was being treated unfairly and, consequently, voted as a bloc for acquittal
or for a lenient sentence, they would need to pick up, at most, only one more member's vote
to prevail in the verdict or sentence, since the result is generally reached by two-thirds of the
voting members. See discussion infra Section III.B.
77 MCM, supra note 15, R.C.M. 912(d).
78 Id. R.C.M. 912(f)(3). A military trial judge is expected by the appellate courts to
"grant challenges for cause liberally." United States v. White, 36 M.J. 284, 287 (C.M.A.
1993); United States v. Dimberio, 52 M.J. 550, 561 (A.F. Ct. Crim. App. 1999).
79 MCM, supra note 15, R.C.M. 912(g). For an excellent discussion of the history of
peremptory challenges in military practice, and appellate decisions involving such
challenges, see Robert W. Best, Peremptory Challenges in Military Criminal Justice
Practice: It Is Time to Challenge Them off, 183 MIL. L. REv. 1, 25-42 (2005).
In certain unusual situations, such as when alternate jurors step in to replace challenged
jurors because the panel has fallen below the statutory quorum, additional peremptory
challenges are allowed, but generally, the counsel for each party is restricted to a single
peremptory challenge. MCM, supra note 15, R.C.M. 912(g)(2). The net result of the senior
commander's pre-selection of the panel members (instead of a randomly selected large
venire or jury pool), followed by the process of challenging some members off the panel
(and then, sometimes, the seating of alternates also pre-designated by the senior commander,
followed by more challenges), is that the process of seating a jury for a court-martial should
be regarded more as a process of selecting which prospective jurors should not participate
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In contrast to the mandated number of jurors required in federal and
state civilian criminal trials (frequently twelve), 80 a general court-martial
jury may lawfully include as few as five voting members. 8' Typically,
however, the general court-martial convenes with ten or twelve members,
and after the exercise of challenges by the parties, between six and ten
members are left to actually hear and decide the case. (However, there is no
prohibition against a significantly larger court-martial panel, 82 and indeed
for a military capital trial, at least twelve members are usually required. 83)
Despite the difference between the civilian and military processes for
jury selection, the members of the court-martial are the functional
equivalent of the civilian criminal jury. 4 In open court, 5 the members, as a
panel, receive preliminary instructions from the military judge about their
responsibilities in the trial, listen to opening statements from counsel for
each side, listen to witness testimony, consider any other evidence, 86 and
finally listen to the closing arguments presented by counsel for each side.87
rather than one in which counsel decide which people are acceptable as jurors. Thus, from
the viewpoint of counsel, the military process is more accurately termed "selection off'
rather than "selection onto" the jury. See Best, supra, at 4-5 ("Unlike jury selection in the
civilian sector, with its typically larger number of available peremptory challenges, the
process of seating a panel is more akin to member deselection than member selection.")
(footnote omitted).
80 See discussion infra Section III.A.
8i See UCMJ art. 16(1), 10 U.S.C. § 816(1); MCM, supra note 15, R.C.M. 501(a)(1)(A).
82 When the senior commander appoints the members of a GCM panel, he generally
appoints a large enough slate of principal and alternate members so that, after the defense
and prosecution have exercised challenges, the remaining number of members will at least
satisfy the statutory quorum. Most military courtrooms are configured with a jury box
designed to seat a dozen or so voting members, with a jury deliberation room designed to
accommodate a panel of about that size.
83 UCMJ art. 25a, 10 U.S.C.A. § 825a (2005).
84 Weiss v. United States, 510 U.S. 163, 167 n.I (1994) ("The members' responsibilities
are analogous to, but somewhat greater than, those of civilian jurors."); see United States v.
Scheffer, 523 U.S. 303, 312-13 (1998) (implicitly equating the members of a court-martial to
civilian jurors in a discussion of the role of the jury in determining credibility of witnesses);
2 GILLIGAN & LEDERER, supra note 4, at 3-4.
85 Trials by court-martial are almost always open to any interested member of the public
or press, although there is legal authority to close public access in some rare circumstances,
such as cases involving classified information. See MCM, supra note 15, R.C.M. 806; see
also SCHLUETER, supra note 40, § 15-3.
86 MCM, supra note 15, R.C.M. 913(a)-(c). Rules of evidence in a court-martial are
generally consistent with those used in federal criminal trials. The Military Rules of
Evidence are contained in Part III of the MCM, supra note 15, and are largely patterned after
the Federal Rules of Evidence, with a few "modifications [that] incorporate specialized
military practices." SCHLUETER, supra note 40, § 15-19.
87 MCM, supra note 15, R.C.M. 919.
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Then, guided by the military judge's instructions about the governing law,
88
the members go behind closed doors to collectively deliberate in order to
reach their verdict. 89  If the accused is found guilty, the trial moves
promptly into a sentencing phase, during which the same members hear
additional evidence, further argument by counsel, and additional
instructions from the military judge. Then, the panel members deliberate
together in private in order to determine an appropriate sentence. 90 In
contrast with civilian criminal trial juries, the military court members have
significant discretion in the formulation of a sentence; for most offenses,
the MCM specifies only the maximum punishment, and the members
decide what period of imprisonment or other punishment is appropriate
subject to that upper limit, taking into consideration the particular
circumstances of the case.9'
The military defendant often elects to have a bench trial ("trial by
military judge alone") instead of a trial in which jury members determine
the verdict and sentence.92 Moreover, even when the defendant prefers a
88 UCMJ art. 5 1(c), 10 U.S.C. § 85 1(c) (2000); MCM, supra note 15, R.C.M. 920.
89 UCMJ art. 39(b), 10 U.S.C. § 839(b) (deliberations must be in closed session); id.
5 1(a), 10 U.S.C. § 85 l(a) (verdict, or "findings," must be by secret ballot); MCM, supra note
15, R.C.M. 921. The finding as to any particular allegation may be guilty, guilty only of a
less serious offense included in the charged offense, guilty with minor variance, not guilty by
reason of lack of mental responsibility, or not guilty. MCM, supra note 15, R.C.M. 918.
90 MCM, supra note 15, R.C.M. 1001; see 2 GILLIGAN & LEDERER, supra note 4, § 23-
11.00.
91 The UCMJ provides for a specific punishment only with respect to a few particular
offenses. See, e.g., UCMJ art. 106, 10 U.S.C. § 901 (prescribing death for spying); id. art.
118(l); 10 U.S.C. § 918(1) (prescribing death or imprisonment for life for premeditated
murder); United States v. Shroeder, 27 M.J. 87, 90 n.2 (C.M.A. 1988) (ruling that currently,
the only mandatory sentences prescribed by the UCMJ are mandatory death sentence for
spying and mandatory minimum sentence of life imprisonment for premeditated murder or
felony murder). For most crimes, however, the members may impose "any lawful sentence,"
as long as the combination of punishments does not exceed the jurisdictional authority of
that type of court-martial and does not exceed the maximum specified by the President for
that offense in Part IV of the MCM. See UCMJ art. 56, 10 U.S.C. § 856. The members'
discretion even extends to adjudging a sentence of "no punishment." See MCM, supra note
15, R.C.M. 1002.
92 At the point when such election must be made, the accused and his defense counsel
know the identity of the jurors who comprise the panel as well as the identity of the military
judge. UCMJ art. 16(l)(B), 10 U.S.C. § 816(l)(B); MCM, supra note 15, R.C.M. 903.
The accused must affirmatively elect to have his trial conducted by the "military judge
sitting alone," but the prosecution has no authority to block the election of a bench trial. See
MCM, supra note 15, R.C.M. 903(c)(2)(B). Here, the military defendant has a significantly
broader entitlement than his civilian counterpart to choose a bench trial instead of a jury trial.
The defendant in federal court may choose a bench trial only if the prosecutor concurs with
that request. See FED. R. CRIM. P. 23(a) (criminal defendant has right to trial by judge alone
only if the judge and prosecutor concur); United States v. Singer, 380 U.S. 24, 36 (1965)
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panel of voting members, the accused frequently elects to plead guilty,
93
leaving the jury to determine only the appropriate sentence for the crime.
As a result, in the majority of courts-martial, as in most criminal trials in
civilian jurisdictions, jurors do not determine guilt or innocence.
Nonetheless, in several thousand military trials each year, both in the
United States and wherever else American forces are deployed around the
world, defendants who plead "not guilty" and who do not elect to have a
bench trial have their culpability determined by military jurors.94 Section
III of this Article examines how several key features of the procedures
followed by military juries in such contested cases compare to the usual
practices in state felony trials, and suggests that adopting those military
verdict practices would improve the criminal trial process in state courts.
95
III. IMPROVING STATE CRIMINAL VERDICTS BY ADOPTING MILITARY JURY
PROCEDURES
A jury decision reached through the military approach, which allows a
non-unanimous verdict, requires secret balloting, and provides for a default
acquittal, results in a more reliable verdict and increases the efficiency of
the criminal trial.
The historic function of the jury in the American criminal trial is to
insure that the judgment that a citizen is, culpable of a serious crime is
reached by a group of his fellow citizens, rather than by a government
(holding that Federal Rule of Criminal Procedure 23(a) is valid since the defendant has no
constitutional right to trial by judge alone).
93 MCM, supra note 15, R.C.M. 910. Before accepting a guilty plea, the military judge
is required to conduct an extensive "providence inquiry," during which the defendant
answers the judge's questions under oath, to satisfy the judge that the guilty plea is being
made voluntarily and with an appreciation of its consequences. See 2 GILLIGAN & LEDERER,
supra note 4, § 19-20.00. The military judge's providence inquiry, under MCM provisions
and judicial decisions, is considerably more extensive than those required of federal district
courts. Id. at 205 n.89.
94 This approximation is based on the aggregate number of courts-martial involving a
panel of members, for all of the armed forces, from the annual reports of the service Judge
Advocates General for FY 2000 thru 2005. See USCAAF ANNUAL REPORT (2000-2005
annually), supra note 8.
95 This Article does not propose that the jurors for state practice be selected in any
manner that would approximate the military practice. The military practice of appointment
of the voting members of a court-martial by the senior commander, as opposed to the
random selection process common in the civil sector, has been thoroughly debated. See
discussion supra note 41. Likewise, this Article does not suggest that the size of state juries
be reduced to less than twelve jurors, like the smaller quorum ordinarily permitted in courts-
martial. See supra text accompanying notes 80-83 for a discussion of the number of
members required for courts-martial.
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official.96 To accomplish that, every American state except Louisiana and
Oregon provide that the verdict in a felony case can be reached only with
the unanimous assent of the jury.97 Stated another way, no verdict (whether
of guilt or acquittal) can be reached without the agreement of every
participating juror. By comparison, the military practice improves the
reliability and efficiency of the jury trial by combining three features. The
court-martial practice: (1) allows a super-majority to reach a guilty
verdict; 98 (2) dictates a verdict of acquittal whenever guilt is not established
to the satisfaction of the requisite super-majority of the jurors;99 and (3)
requires that each member of the jury vote confidentially.100  The
conjunction of these three critical features of military jury procedure results
in a verdict that better protects a defendant from improper conviction and,
at the same time, improves the efficiency of the trial process.' 01
A. HOW THE TYPICAL STATE JURY REACHES ITS VERDICT
In forty-eight American states, the verdict in a felony trial can be
reached only by unanimous agreement of the jurors. 10 2 Louisiana allows
ten of the twelve jurors to reach a verdict in non-capital felony trials.
10 3
Oregon likewise permits a verdict when at least ten of the twelve jurors
96 "[T]he jury's essential feature lies in the 'interposition between the accused and his
accuser of the commonsense judgment of a group of laymen, and in the community
participation and shared responsibility that results from that group's determination of guilt or
innocence."' Burch v. Louisiana, 441 U.S. 130, 135 (1979) (quoting Williams v. Florida,
399 U.S. 78, 100 (1970)). At the time the Bill of Rights was added to the Federal
Constitution, "[bloth the militia and the jury reflected suspicion of paid, professional central
officialdom-a central standing army on the one hand, and judges, prosecutors, and
bureaucrats on the other." Akhil Reed Amar, Reinventing Juries: Ten Suggested Reforms,
28 U.C. DAVIS L. REV. 1169, 1170 (1995).
97 See DAVID B. ROTTMAN ET AL., CONF. OF STATE COURT ADM'RS & NAT'L CTR. FOR
STATE COURTS, STATE COURT ORGANIZATION 1998, 278-82 tbl.42 (2000), available at
http://www.ojp.usdoj.gov/bjs/abstract/sco98.htm. In Louisiana, for non-capital felony trials,
the verdict may be reached by agreement of ten of the twelve jurors. LA. CODE CRIM. PROC.
ANN. art. 782(A) (1998). In Oregon, for most non-capital felony trials, the verdict may be
reached by agreement of ten of the twelve jurors; however, to convict for non-capital
murder, at least eleven of the twelve jurors must concur. OR. REV. STAT. § 136.450 (2005).
98 See discussion infra Section III.C.
99 See discussion id.
'00 See discussion infra Section III.D.
101 See discussion id.
102 See ROTTMAN ET AL., supra note 97, at 278-82 tbl.42; J. Clark Kelso, Final Report of
the Blue Ribbon Commission on Jury System Improvement, 47 HASTINGS L.J. 1433, 1494 &
app. M (1996).
103 LA. CODE CRIM. PROC. ANN. art. 782(A) (1998).
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agree in most non-capital felony trials; for non-capital murder, eleven of the
twelve jurors must agree.
10 4
In most states, the trial judge provides the jurors with very little
guidance about the deliberative process and the procedure for actually
adopting a verdict. Of course, the typical pre-deliberation charge includes
detailed discussion of such matters as the elements of the offenses under
consideration, the burden of proof, the reasonable doubt standard, and the
jurors' responsibilities to assess the credibility of the various witnesses and
to determine the facts, but "[m]any jurisdictions still shy away from giving
jurors any advice on their deliberations."'10 5 Typically, with regard to the
process of reaching a verdict, the trial judge simply instructs the jury that it
must engage in a thorough consideration of the evidence, that it must elect a
foreman to present the verdict, and that unanimous agreement of all jurors
is required for any verdict (whether guilty or not guilty).
10 6
The judge's charge ordinarily makes no mention of whether an actual
vote by the jury is necessary to signify each juror's position (regarding
either the individual's preliminary viewpoint or final position), except to
state that a verdict must represent the view of all of the jurors. 10 7 In other
words, the judge instructs the jury that all jurors must assent, but does not
provide any guidance on how such assent can or must be registered. The
judge does not instruct the jurors that once they have discussed the
evidence, they should register their own personal assessments of the proper
verdict by casting secret ballots, or even that they may vote secretly if they
choose to do so.' 0 8 As will be seen, the military judge's instructions to a
104 OR. REV. STAT. § 136.450 (2005).
105 Robert G. Boatright & Beth Murphy, "Behind Closed Doors ": Assisting Jurors with
Their Deliberations, 83 JUDICATURE 52, 52 (1999).
106 See, e.g., COMM. ON STANDARD JURY INSTRUCTIONS, CALIFORNIA JURY INSTRUCTIONS,
CRIMINAL § 17.50 (2004 ed.); ILL. SUPREME COURT COMM. ON PATTERN JURY INSTRUCTIONS
IN CRIMINAL CASES, ILLINOIS PATTERN JURY INSTRUCTIONS, CRIMINAL § 26.01 (2000 ed.);
HOWARD G. LEVENTHAL & BUDD G. GOODMAN, CHARGES TO THE JURY AND REQUESTS TO
CHARGE IN A CRIMINAL CASE, NEW YORK § 3:02 (1968 ed.); PAUL J. MCCLUNG, TEXAS
CRIMINAL JURY CHARGES § 1:360 (1999 & Supp. 2004).
107 See id.
108 When researchers for the American Judicature Society convened focus groups of
people who had actually served as jurors in several jurisdictions, "[n]one of the focus group
participants recalled receiving any guidance on how or when to vote." Boatright & Murphy,
supra note 105, at 53, 55 (emphasis added). The researchers discovered that "[a]dvice on
how and when to take the initial vote is virtually non-existent in court-provided juror
handbooks and judges' instructions." Id. at 55. Because of the dearth of information given
to most juries on how to work toward a verdict, the American Judicature Society published a
guidebook, Behind Closed Doors: A Guide for Jury Deliberations, in 1999, and
recommended that trial judges provide it to their jurors. See id. at 53. Unfortunately, the
guidebook stopped short of recommending any particular voting approach; it simply
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court-martial jury are much more specific, and that specificity furthers the
integrity of the verdict as the honest viewpoint of the individuals who make
up the jury.
10 9
If the state criminal jury's discussions and deliberations result in
agreement among all twelve of the jurors that the defendant should be
convicted, or alternatively that he ought to be acquitted, then the jury has
reached a verdict. If the twelve jurors report that they are unable to reach
complete agreement for either conviction or acquittal, the judge will
typically attempt to prod them toward unanimity with what is commonly
called the "Allen charge."" 0 Eventually, if prospects grow dim that the
jurors will be able to reach unanimous agreement either way, the judge will
accept the jury's belief that it has deadlocked and that further efforts to
reach a verdict will be futile. In such a "hung jury" situation, the state trial
judge will declare a mistrial."'
The double jeopardy clause is applicable to state prosecutions.'
2
However, when a trial judge declares a mistrial under circumstances of
manifest necessity, the jeopardy of the first trial does not end, and a
subsequent retrial is considered to continue the same jeopardy. Thus, re-
prosecution after a mistrial does not violate the double jeopardy
prohibition." 3 The hung jury situation "is the paradigmatic example of
manifest necessity" justifying a mistrial."
4
Assuming that prosecutorial misconduct did not cause the hung jury," 5
the district attorney may lawfully pursue the same charges against the
defendant at a subsequent retrial, before a different jury." 16 In theory, there
is no legal limitation on the number of times a hung jury caused by failure
"mention[ed] various voting techniques-for instance, written and secret votes, or open
voice votes-as options available to the jury." See id. at 55.
109 See discussion infra notes 118-120 and accompanying text.
110 Allen v. United States, 164 U.S. 492, 501 (1896).
111 See, e.g., United States v. McIntosh, 380 F.3d 548, 551-53 (1st Cir. 2004).
112 See Arizona v. Washington, 434 U.S. 497, 503 (1978) ("A State may not put a
defendant in jeopardy twice for the same offense. The constitutional protection against
double jeopardy unequivocally prohibits a second trial following an acquittal.") (citation
omitted).
113 United States v. Sanford, 429 U.S. 14, 15-16 (1976); see, e.g., United States v.
Brown, 426 F.3d 32 (1st Cir. 2005); Rhodes v. State, 624 S.E.2d 268 (Ga. Ct. App. 2005);
Commonwealth v. Medina, 835 N.E.2d 300 (Mass. App. Ct. 2005); In re Candelario, 118
P.3d 349, 352 (Wash. Ct. App. 2005); Meyers v. State, 124 P.3d 710 (Wyo. 2005).
114 McIntosh, 380 F.3d at 553.
115 See id. at 557.
116 Sanford, 429 U.S. at 15-16.
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to reach unanimity can cause a defendant to face prosecution on the same
charge. " 17
B. HOW A COURT-MARTIAL REACHES ITS VERDICT
In the general court-martial, by contrast, the military judge instructs
the members (jurors) in much more detail concerning how to proceed
during their closed session of deliberations so as to reach a verdict. 118 First,
the military judge instructs the members that their "deliberation should
include a full and free discussion of all the evidence that has been
presented. ' ' 19 She next instructs them that "[after the members] have
completed [their] discussion, then voting on [the] findings [the military
term for the verdict on a particular allegation] must be accomplished by
secret, written ballot, and all members of the court are required to vote.'
' 20
This military requirement that the jurors officially determine the actual
verdict by casting individual written ballots, the contents of which are kept
secret from the other jurors, has no counterpart in present civilian
practice. 121
Since no member may abstain from the vote on the findings, and since
the judge instructs the members that "if there is reasonable doubt as to the
guilt of the accused, that doubt must be resolved in favor of the accused and
he must be acquitted,"' 122 this instruction clearly establishes that any
member not satisfied of guilt beyond a reasonable doubt is duty-bound to
vote "not guilty" on that particular charge.
The military judge also specifically instructs the jury on how to count
the votes. 123  While the state criminal jury elects a jury foreman, the
117 Washington v. Sobina, 387 F. Supp. 2d 460, 469 (E.D. Pa. 2005) (holding that the
double jeopardy doctrine is not violated by four trials on the same charge, where the first
trial ended in a mistrial, and the second and third trials resulted in a hung jury as to certain
counts; each retrial was legally appropriate, and none was the result of misconduct by the
government).
118 The UCMJ requires that the military judge instruct the members on these key matters
of procedure in deliberating and in voting upon the verdict. UCMJ art. 51(c), 10 U.S.C.
§ 85 1(c) (2000); MCM, supra note 15, R.C.M. 920(e)(6).
119 MILITARY JUDGES' BENCHBOOK, supra note 66, 2-5-14.
120 Id. (emphasis added).
121 See supra text accompanying notes 105-109 (discussing state court instructions on
how jurors are to reach verdict).
122 MILITARY JUDGES' BENCHBOOK, supra note 66, 2-5-12.
123 The members of the court-martial are instructed at the very beginning of each trial
that the instructions of the military judge must be obeyed. Id. 2-5 ("Members of the court,
.. . [m]y duty as military judge is to ensure this trial is conducted in a fair, orderly and
impartial manner according to the law. I preside over open sessions, rule upon objections,
and instruct you on the law applicable to this case. You are required to follow my
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president of the military jury panel is the senior member by rank. 2 4 The
judge instructs the members that after each member writes out a vote with
regard to a particular allegation, "[t]he junior member [of the jury] will
collect and count the votes [, and the] count will then be checked by the
president, who will immediately announce the result of the ballot to the
members."' 125 In this manner, the individual jurors do not divulge their final
votes to each other or to anyone else.
126
Military jury practice requires that at least two-thirds of the members
of the panel vote guilty in order to render a verdict of guilty on a particular
offense. 127 The military judge calculates the specific number of "guilty"
votes required for conviction, depending on the total number of jurors on
that particular court-martial panel (two-thirds of the number of members on
that court-martial, rounded up to the next whole number). 128 Then, before
sending the jurors into closed deliberations, the military judge instructs
instructions on the law .... "). The military judge's instructions are not guidelines or
suggestions; they carry exactly the same weight with the military juror that the charge by a
state trial judge carries with the civilian juror. See MCM, supra note 15, R.C.M. 801(a)
(providing that the military judge is the presiding officer of the court-martial, controls the
proceedings, rules on all questions of law, and instructs the members on all questions of law
and procedure); id. R.C.M. 502(a)(2) (requiring that the members of the court-martial
determine the verdict and any sentence "based on the evidence and in accordance with the
instructions of the military judge").
124 MCM, supra note 15, R.C.M. 502(b)(1).
125 MILITARY JUDGES' BENCHBOOK, supra note 66, 2-5-14.
126 Having the secret ballots physically collected by the junior juror helps to preserve the
secrecy of each juror's vote, and especially helps to ensure that the jurors are not pressured
by concern that the more senior members of the panel will know how any individual juror
voted. See United States v. Harris, 30 M.J. 1150, 1151 (A.C.M.R. 1990); United States v.
Kendrick, 29 M.J. 792, 793-94 (A.C.M.R. 1989) (junior member of panel must collect
written ballots). Additionally, having the votes contained in those written secret ballots
actually counted by the junior member of the jury adds a measure of verification of the
voting result when the president of the panel announces it to all of the jurors. See United
States v. Truitt, 32 M.J. 1010, 1011 (A.C.M.R. 1991) ("[Historically] the mechanism for
insulating junior members from the opinions of their seniors was retained by requiring that
the junior member collect the ballots. If the junior member collects the ballots, the senior
member is less likely to see how each member voted; but if the senior member collects the
ballots, then he can readily identify each member's ballot, raising the possibility that the
junior members will defer to the senior member's opinion.... [T]he requirement for the
junior member to count the votes [is intended to be] a vote verification procedure.").
127 UCMJ art. 52(a)(2), 10 U.S.C. § 852(a)(2) (2000); United States v. Shroeder, 27 M.J.
87, 90-91 (C.A.A.F. 1988) (aside from capital cases, a two-thirds vote of court members is
sufficient to convict the accused of murder, even though a three-fourths majority of members
is necessary to impose a sentence of ten years or more). The military defendant is entitled to
a separate finding, or verdict, as to each offense charged. See United States v. Timmerman,
28 M.J. 531, 536 (A.F. Ct. Crim. App. 1989).
128 MILITARY JUDGES' BENCHBOOK, supra note 66, 2-5-14.
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them that if the balloting shows the required number of guilty votes, "then
that will result in a guilty finding for that offense. If fewer than [two-thirds
of the members] vote for a finding of guilty, then [the] ballot [will result] in
a finding of not guilty.' ' 129 In other words, the default position for the
military jury is a verdict of acquittal, which automatically results from any
situation except where the individual, secret, written votes of two-thirds or
more of the jurors are that the soldier defendant is guilty of the particular
offense. This automatic "not guilty" verdict, arising whenever the vote is
insufficient to convict, eliminates any possibility of a hung jury as to guilt
or innocence. 1
30
C. THE ADVANTAGE OF USING THE COURT-MARTIAL'S NON-
UNANIMOUS VERDICT WITH ITS DEFAULT ACQUITTAL PROVISION
Military verdict procedures allow a guilty verdict by the concurrence
of a substantial majority of the jurors but automatically provide for acquittal
when an insufficient number of jurors (less than a super-majority) are not
convinced of guilt beyond a reasonable doubt.' 3' These features result in a
reliable guilty or not guilty verdict and enhance trial efficiency at the same
time. Similarly, using a twelve-person jury, a state could improve its jury
process in both reliability and finality by setting the required threshold for
conviction at eight of twelve (66.6%), nine of twelve (75%), ten of twelve
(83%), or even eleven of twelve jurors (92%), combined with the provision
that the defendant is to be acquitted of the offense unless the specified
super-majority of jurors agree on guilt. Adoption of the military procedure
for jury verdicts, incorporating these two complementary features, would
provide an effective alternative to the unanimous verdict approach now
used by most states.
1. Super-majority Verdicts and Constitutional Norms
The constitutional requirement of due process does not require that
state criminal trials employ the unanimous verdict, as long as a super-
majority verdict is used only in connection with a jury composed of twelve
(or more) jurors. The Supreme Court squarely addressed this question with
decisions in 1972 and 1979.
129 Id. The judge also instructs the members that, in the event they find the defendant not
guilty of the charged offense, they must proceed to a new vote or votes by similar secret
balloting procedures to determine if the defendant will be found guilty of any lesser included
offense that the judge has instructed them to consider. Id.
130 2 GILLIGAN & LEDERER, supra note 4, § 22-42.00.
131 See supra text accompanying notes 128-129.
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In the 1972 companion cases of Johnson v. Louisiana 32 and Apodaca
v. Oregon,133 defendants challenged convictions rendered by twelve-person
juries under the laws of the two states that permitted a guilty verdict in
felony trials without the unanimous agreement of the jurors. Johnson was
convicted of robbery by a nine-to-three vote in a Louisiana trial, 134 and
Apodaca, Cooper, and Madden were convicted of assault with a deadly
weapon, burglary, and grand larceny in separate Oregon trials by votes of
eleven-to-one, ten-to-two, and eleven-to-one, respectively.135  The
defendants argued that the Sixth Amendment right to jury trial in criminal
cases applied to state criminal trials by virtue of the Due Process Clause of
the Fourteenth Amendment, and that, accordingly, their guilty verdicts
based on non-unanimous jury votes were unconstitutional.
36
The Court split five to four in its decision to affirm all of the
challenged convictions in each case. In the Oregon cases, where the
verdicts were eleven-to-one and ten-to-two, four justices expressed the
opinion that the Sixth Amendment does not require unanimous verdicts by
juries of twelve, without distinguishing between state and federal criminal
trials. 137 Justice Powell joined their votes to affirm the state convictions on
the basis that, while the Sixth Amendment requires unanimity in federal
criminal verdicts, the Fourteenth Amendment does not compel the states to
use unanimous verdicts. 38 In the Louisiana decision, five justices joined
the opinion of the Court that a nine-to-three verdict, because it had been
reached by "a substantial majority of the jury,"'3 9 did not deprive the
defendant of due process of law.' 40  Four justices dissented from both
decisions, expressing the view that non-unanimous verdicts in state or
federal trials violated the due process rights of the defendants. 14'
The Court clearly held in 1979 that the precedent for states to use
substantial majority votes for criminal verdicts in felony cases did not apply
132 406 U.S. 356 (1972).
113 406 U.S. 404 (1972) (plurality opinion).
134 Johnson, 406 U.S. at 358.
131 Apodaca, 406 U.S. at 405-06 (plurality opinion).
136 Johnson, 406 U.S. at 357-58; Apodaca, 406 U.S. at 406 (plurality opinion).
137 Apodaca, 406 U.S. at 411 (plurality opinion). To the extent that the plurality opinion
seemed to address federal jury trials as well as the state trials under consideration, it clearly
was dicta.
138 See Johnson, 406 U.S. at 370-71 (Powell, J., concurring in Johnson, and concurring in
the judgment in Apodaca).
139 Id. at 362.
140 Id. at 365.
141 See id. at 397-99 (Stewart, J., joined by Brennan and Marshall, JJ., dissenting); id. at
388 (Douglas, J., joined by Brennan and Marshall, JJ., dissenting).
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to six-person juries. In Burch v. Louisiana, all nine justices agreed that
non-unanimous guilty verdicts reached in state trials for non-petty offenses
deprived the accused of due process when those trials were conducted with
only six jurors.142 (Although the Court declined to rule on the legitimacy of
non-unanimous verdicts reached by juries of between seven and eleven
persons, 143 no state's criminal procedures have yet raised this issue.)
After these decisions, the principle that a state may permit felony trial
verdicts based on the agreement of a substantial majority of a twelve person
jury, consistent with the federal constitutional requirement to afford due
process in state criminal trials, remains sound.
2. Addressing Concerns About Non-unanimous Verdicts
Of course, concluding that non-unanimous verdicts of twelve-person
juries in state felony trials meet constitutional norms of due process under
the Fourteenth Amendment does not establish that such verdicts are
preferable to the unanimous verdicts currently used in the overwhelming
majority of criminal jury trials. Supporters of the jury unanimity
requirement generally argue for its retention on several policy grounds,
claiming that only unanimous verdicts will assure legitimacy of the verdict,
guarantee thorough deliberations, and protect unpopular minorities. 
44
The notion that the public views unanimous verdicts as more
legitimate proceeds from the premise that public confidence that guilt is
established beyond a reasonable doubt results only when every juror is
convinced of the defendant's guilt.1 45 The argument is that the unanimous
verdict more reliably protects the innocent from wrongful conviction by
erecting an extremely high hurdle for a guilty verdict, and that this
increased reliability is the sine qua non of public respect for jury verdicts. 1
46
142 See Burch v. Louisiana, 441 U.S. 130, 138-39 (1979) (opinion joined by six justices,
with the three dissenters agreeing that a six-person state jury must be unanimous to provide
due process for a non-petty offense conviction).
143 Id. at 138 n.ll.
144 Shari Seidman Diamond, Mary R. Rose & Beth Murphy, Revisiting the Unanimity
Requirement: The Behavior of the Non-Unanimous Civil Jury, 100 Nw. U. L. REV. 201, 204
(2006); Kim Taylor-Thompson, Empty Votes in Jury Deliberations, 113 HARV. L. REV.
1261, 1264 (2000); James Kachmar, Comment, Silencing the Minority: Permitting
Nonunanimous Jury Verdicts in Criminal Trials, 28 PAc. L.J. 273, 302-03 (1996); see
JEFFREY ABRAMSON, WE, THE JURY 182-85 (paperback ed. 2000).
145 See Johnson, 406 U.S. at 388-89 (Douglas, J., dissenting).
146 See ABRAMSON, supra note 144, at 190-91; Stephan Landsman, 12-Member Juries
and Unanimous Verdicts: A Debate, 88 JUDICATURE 301, 303 (2005) (arguing that "the
unanimity-of-decision rule... enhance[s] the likelihood of accuracy while at the same time
promoting diversity and legitimacy").
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For unanimity supporters, the common thread in their concerns seems to be
the assumption that allowing a super-majority to reach a guilty verdict
would make convictions easier for the prosecution. If that assumption were
accurate, one would expect that the armed forces would have a sharply
higher court-martial conviction rate than the state criminal systems, where
the conviction rates of the forty-eight states that require unanimous verdicts
would heavily influence any aggregate data. In fact, some data suggest that
conviction rates for contested trials before civilian juries and before general
courts-martial are about the same.147  (Of course, conviction rates in a
particular jurisdiction are affected by many other variables, including the
degree to which pre-trial screening has already eliminated cases where the
evidence shows innocence or even substantial weakness of the
prosecution's evidence; however, if that variable has any pertinent tendency
to skew the comparison, the rigorous screening of most military felony
cases before referral to a court-martial ought to raise the military conviction
rate. 148) In any event, there is little empirical basis to assume that the
military approach (allowing a super-majority of the jurors to convict) has
seriously disadvantaged the defendant, especially since the court-martial
practice results in an acquittal whenever the jury does not convict by secret
vote of the jurors. Accordingly, we ought to take a closer look at the
claimed virtues of unanimity.
The proposition that the unanimous verdict has unique legitimacy is
not self-evident. Our society rarely requires any deliberative body to agree
unanimously in order to adopt a weighty proposal, much less to reach any
conclusive decision to adopt or defeat the proposal. 149  For example,
147 One commentator compared data from civilian and military trials in 2001 as follows:
[The] conviction rate for general courts-martial is actually slightly lower than for felonies in
federal district courts or in the seventy-five largest metropolitan areas of the United States. The
overall conviction rate for general courts-martial in fiscal year 2001 was 95% (1675 convictions
out of 1756 total cases in the services combined). This figure was obtained by adding together
the total reported general court-martial convictions from the Army, Navy (including the
Marines), Air Force, and Coast Guard and dividing by the total reported number of general
courts-martial held. In the federal system, the conviction rate for felonies (including guilty
pleas) that were not dismissed was 98.37% percent [sic]. This figure was obtained by dividing
the total number of convictions in the federal system in fiscal year 2001 (68,156) by the total
number of cases that were not dismissed (69,283). In the seventy-five largest metropolitan areas,
the felony conviction rate was about 95%.
Behan, supra note 41, at 302 n.573 (citations omitted).
148 See BAILEY, supra note 20, at 35 ("In my opinion, the single greatest attribute of the
military system is its painstakingly careful pretrial screening procedure-which does, in fact,
eliminate most innocent men from ever going to a full-fledged court-martial.").
149 See Amar, supra note 96, at 1189 ("[Mjost of our analogies [of decision-making] tug
toward majority rule-legislatures generally use it; voters abide by it; appellate benches
follow it."). For example, when the Senate exercises its constitutional responsibility to
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Americans have not generally questioned the legitimacy of the
constitutional amendments affording women or eighteen-year olds the right
to vote on the grounds that our federal Constitution was amended with the
assent of only three-quarters of the several state legislatures, rather than by
all fifty states. 50
When a deliberative body of individuals must agree on some crucial
matter, the democratic tradition typically entrusts such a decision to the
collective wisdom of the body by specifying some level of assent to adopt a
proposition; a failure to reach that degree of assent does not deadlock any
decision, but is itself a conclusive rejection of that proposition.15 ' Although
only two states presently allow felony verdicts by super-majority vote of
jurors, many states do permit super-majority verdicts in civil trials and for
less serious criminal cases, apparently without loss of public acceptance of
the legitimacy of the results of such trials,'52
Our society follows the majority approach even when the decision
involved is one that has critical consequences for the personal liberties of
individual citizens, such as whether to adopt legislation that will impose
"advise and consent" to the nomination of a new justice for the Supreme Court, unanimous
agreement among the members of its Judiciary Committee or in the Senate itself is not
required for decision. See U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 10. Likewise, even the crucial question
of whether the nation will declare a state of war does not require the assent of every member
of the Congress. See id.
150 Id. art. V.
151 While Article I does not expressly state that each chamber of Congress normally acts
by majority vote, several specific provisions clearly imply that the Senate and the House of
Representatives ordinarily act by majority vote of the legislators in each chamber, rather than
by unanimous consent of each chamber. First, the Vice-President has a vote only when the
members of the Senate "be equally divided." Id. art. I, § 3, cl. 4. A vice-presidential vote
when the senators are equally divided would be superfluous if the Senate could only make
decisions by unanimous assent. Second, a substantial minority may require that each
chamber record the "yeas and nays of the members ... on any question." Id. art. I, § 5, cl. 3.
Third, the power of Congress to override a presidential veto of a bill by two-thirds vote in
each chamber would have little meaning if bills could not be initially enacted except with
unanimous consent within each chamber. See id. art. I, § 7, cl. 2. Finally, a chamber may
expel one of its members with the concurrence of two-thirds of its members. Id. art. I, § 5,
cl. 2.
152 Criticizing a proposed ABA standard that would call for all serious criminal cases to
use the unanimous verdict, the director of the American Judicature Society's National Jury
Center argued, "Proponents of the unanimity requirement argue that it is necessary to confer
legitimacy on verdicts. The acceptance by the public, bench, and bar of super-majority
verdicts in many jurisdictions shows that legitimacy is not compromised by less-than-
unanimous verdicts. ABA Principle 4 is a solution in search of a problem." David McCord,
Juries Should Not Be Required to Have 12 Members or to Render Unanimous Verdicts, 88
JUDICATURE 301, 305 (2005).
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criminal sanctions for engaging in certain proscribed conduct.1 53 Appellate
courts do not continue to deliberate in appeals of criminal convictions until
their judges unanimously agree on whether to affirm or reverse the
conviction. Even cases involving the death penalty are affirmed by
appellate courts by majority votes; appellate practice does not require that
all appellate judges agree to uphold a particular defendant's death sentence.
Likewise, Professor Amar has pointed out that when the Senate, "acting as
a kind of petit jury," tries an individual such as the President on articles of
impeachment, it can convict by a vote of at least two-thirds of its members;
our federal Constitution does not require the unanimous agreement of all
members of the Senate. 1
54
Modem American experience with courts-martial shows that we do not
need unanimity in order to reliably convict a person on a criminal charge.
Despite long custom, requiring all twelve jurors to agree that guilt has been
established beyond any reasonable doubt is not the only way to demonstrate
a sufficiently convincing consensus of the community so as to provide
reliability and legitimacy for that critical decision. The traditional
requirement of unanimity, instead of celebrating the triumph of collegiality,
places inordinate power in any single juror to thwart the consensus of the
vast majority of the jurors acting as a body.1 55 In short, the single-minded
pursuit of absolute agreement may well lead to a perversion of the truth-
seeking goal.
Let us suppose that in a particular trial, the jurors' careful, deliberate,
collegial examination of the evidence eventually results in every single
juror being fully comfortable with the same outcome, not from desire to
please the other jurors or simply to end the debate and go home, but rather
because each is convinced of the propriety of the decision to acquit or to
convict the defendant based on the weight of the evidence under the law.
Such an outcome is the ideal embodiment of the jury acting as the collective
conscience of the community. In such a situation, however, the legal
requirement that the verdict can only be reached with such unanimity is
completely moot, because, ex hypothesis, this jury reached its verdict not
under the compulsion of such a rule, but without regard to that rule.
Now suppose, instead, that all of the jurors in a given trial have
deliberated patiently and in good faith, carefully discussing all of the
153 Neither Congress nor a state legislature is constitutionally limited in its power to
enact new penal code provisions by any requirement that all of the legislators agree.
154 See Amar, supra note 96, at 1189-90.
"' Cf id. at 1190 ("[If] everyone now gets to serve on a jury, and we eliminate all the
old undemocratic barriers, preserving unanimity might also be undemocratic, for it would
create an extreme minority veto unknown to the Founders.").
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evidence and what it does or does not prove. All viewpoints have been
aired and considered. One juror, or perhaps a small minority of the jurors,
disagrees with the emerging majority viewpoint. Despite good faith on
both sides, no agreement is reached. State law blocks any decision without
unanimity. The pressure on the holdout juror(s) to conform to the majority
position in such a situation is clearly enormous, not necessarily because of
the others' disapproval of the dissenting viewpoint (i.e., both sides may
recognize that the evidence makes for a very close question), but instead
precisely because the very existence of any dissent completely deadlocks
the body. Each juror knows that the deliberative task simply cannot result
in any decision until every juror agrees in the same manner (acquit, convict,
or convict on a particular lesser charge). Again, supposing that all of the
merits have been thoroughly vetted, common experience suggests that the
personal evaluations of the individual jurors may well remain divergent
over such a subjective question as guilt.
In such a situation of rational disagreement, which is all too
plausible, 156 the typical state's prohibition against any verdict without
unanimity leaves the jury with only a few choices, all undesirable: (1) to
grind on in an attempt to get the minority to yield despite its conscientious
misgivings; (2) to let the majority acquiesce to the minority or compromise
on some lesser charge, despite the majority's own conscientious belief in
the correct outcome; 157 or (3) to ask the judge to declare a deadlock. Either
of the first two paths requires some jurors to violate their oath to decide the
case based upon their conscientious evaluation of the evidence under the
governing law. In other words, any juror who, in good conscience, remains
unconvinced of the other bloc's position must nonetheless capitulate to that
position or simply continue to obstruct any conclusive resolution of the
trial, the latter choice pointing toward an eventual mistrial by deadlock.
Because the jurors may have taken either of the first two courses, the
unanimous verdict in a particular trial does not necessarily signify that
every juror agreed to the verdict because of the weight of the evidence;
instead, some perhaps only acquiesced to it out of weariness after
inconclusive deliberations, or some may have simply been unable to
156 One observer concludes that many nominally "unanimous" verdicts are "'watered
down' due to compromises necessary to bring a recalcitrant juror or two on-board."
McCord, supra note 152, at 305. And the unanimous verdict may be the result of peer
pressure overcoming the dissenter's will, rather than the true consensus building its
supporters claim. See ABRAMSON, supra note 144, at 197.
157 One study of trials where unanimous verdicts were required suggested that unanimity
may sometimes cause jurors "to behave more expediently, returning a compromised verdict
that splits the difference between jury factions and has no rational basis. To the extent that
this happens, unanimity does not promote truth." ABRAMSON, supra note 144, at 203.
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withstand the pressures exerted by the rest of the jurors. There is ample
anecdotal evidence that internal coercion underlies some supposedly
unanimous verdicts,158 and some research suggests that this problem is
158 The prevailing rule in both federal and state courts is that new trials are not granted
when a juror alleges irregularities that are internal or intrinsic to the deliberative process,
while relief may be granted upon satisfactory evidence of "extrinsic influences" upon the
jurors, such as bribery coming from outside the jury. Compare Tanner v. United States, 483
U.S. 107, 115-16, 119 (1987) (ruling that the trial judge properly refused to investigate
alleged drug and alcohol use by jurors "partying" during deliberations because "possible
internal abnormalities in a jury will not be inquired into") (citation omitted), with Remmer v.
United States, 347 U.S. 227, 229 (1954) (concluding that a juror's report of attempted bribe
during trial was properly investigated because the "integrity ofjury proceedings must not be
jeopardized by unauthorized invasions").
Thus, a juror's post-verdict contention that her assent to the verdict was caused by
coercive or intimidating pressure exerted by other jurors during deliberations is generally
categorized as internal and is not considered a basis on which to grant a new trial or other
relief. See, e.g., United States v. Roach, 164 F.3d 403, 412-13 (8th Cir. 1998) (finding that
the trial court did not abuse discretion by refusing to order a new trial for three Native
Americans despite a Native American juror's affidavit stating that she had been unwilling to
convict the defendants but changed her vote to guilty only because the other jurors, all white
but one, had pressured her to do so with threats and accusations that she was a racist); People
v. Reid, 583 N.E.2d 1, 1, 4 (Ill. App. Ct. 1991) (holding that the trial court properly ruled
that verdict could not be impeached by a juror's post-verdict assertion that while sequestered
overnight, in middle of deliberations where that juror was the "lone holdout" juror, he
received an anonymous telephone call at his hotel room from a person he believed to be one
of the other jurors, who remarked, "you son of a bitch, we'll get you for that," and then hung
up); Oxtoby v. McGowan, 447 A.2d 860, 869-70 (Md. 1982) (ruling that the trial judge did
not abuse discretion by denying a new trial where a juror's affidavit stated that she had
assented to the verdict only because other jurors verbally abused her during deliberations);
State v. Hage, 853 P.2d 1251, 1256-57 (Mont. 1993) (deciding that the trial court properly
refused to order a new trial based upon the assertion that a juror felt pressured by other jurors
to decide the case, because the assertion was one of internal influence upon the jury); People
v. Anderson, 671 N.Y.S.2d 149, 150 (N.Y. App. Div. 1998) (concluding that the trial court
properly refused to set aside a verdict where the defendant attempted to show that some
jurors pressured and prevailed upon two other jurors in order to prevent further
deliberations); Cavalier Metal Corp. v. Johnson Metal Controls, 124 S.W.3d 122, 127-30
(Tenn. Ct. App. 2003) (finding that courts should not make post-verdict inquiry into intrinsic
influences on jurors such as "intimidation or harassment" of one juror by another). But see
People v. Collins, 730 P.2d 293, 301-02 (Colo. 1986) (deciding that the trial court properly
considered a juror's affidavit suggesting that coercive tactics were employed against her to
force her to give a verdict against her will but found no coercion was used by other jurors);
Lee v. United States, 471 A.2d 683, 684-86 (D.C. 1984) (affirming a ruling against new trial
where the trial court privately interviewed jurors who alleged they were coerced by other
jurors but then found no extraneous influences had improperly influenced the verdict).
These cases, however, demonstrate that the courts are reluctant to pierce the
confidentiality of jury deliberations and also that the courts, quite understandably, are
hesitant to undermine verdict finality by post-verdict inquiry into the internal pressures or
thought processes that result in the jurors' collective decisions. However, these cases all
provide evidence that the so-called "unanimity" of criminal verdicts sometimes is a
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widespread.1 59 (As will be discussed, this aspect of the decision process
also suggests the importance of the military requirement that the jurors use
a secret ballot to reach the verdict. 60)
We can see that the unanimous verdict requirement is not necessarily
synonymous with reliability by posing a very different scenario. Imagine
another trial in which the jury has engaged in careful, deliberate, collegial
examination of all evidence. In this situation, further suppose that one juror
(or some tiny fraction of the jurors), because of an irrational consideration,
continues to disagree with all of the others about the correct answer to the
culpability question. 161 For example, eleven jurors may propose to acquit
the defendant, an illegal alien, of burglary because they find insufficient
evidence of his guilt, but one obstinate juror blocks that verdict, arguing out
of nativist bigotry that the defendant's status as an illegal alien, by itself,
justifies a guilty verdict. In such a situation, requiring unanimity does not
promote justice; the bigot successfully prevents the acquittal that the
defendant deserves. 1
62
A separate argument traditionally offered in support of the unanimous
verdict requirement is that it is necessary to promote the thorough
deliberations that ensure that the jurors in the majority will both carefully
listen to and consider the views of every juror, even those in the minority. 1
63
It is true that, when unanimity is required, the bloc of jurors who favor a
certain verdict are compelled to continue their efforts to bring all other
euphemism for coerced acquiescence by jurors holding the minority view of the evidence.
159 See ABRAMSON, supra note 144, at 197 (discussing data showing the widespread
occurrence of splits among jurors that were eventually overcome by intimidation, as opposed
to persuasion, of would-be holdouts). Such data suggests that the supposedly unanimous
verdict may often be the result of peer pressure overcoming the dissenter(s), rather than the
true consensus building its supporters claim.
160 See discussion infra Section III.D.
161 See Amar, supra note 96, at 1191 ("[U]nanimity cannot guarantee mutual tolerance-
what about the eccentric holdout who refuses to listen to, or even try to persuade, others
('you can't make me, so there!')."). The federal capital trial of self-proclaimed terrorist
Zacarias Moussaoui provided a recent example of the power of a lone holdout juror refusing
even to discuss why he felt the death penalty to be inappropriate, repeatedly deadlocking the
jury at eleven-to-one on the death penalty, so that the jury eventually recommended only a
life sentence for Moussaoui. See Timothy Dwyer, One Juror Between Terrorist And Death:
Moussaoui Foreman Recalls Frustration, WASH. POST, May 12, 2006, at Al, available at
http://www.washingtonpost.com/wp-dyn/content/article/2006/05/ 11/AR2006051101884.
html?sub=new.
162 See Amar, supra note 96, at 1190 n.46 ("Civil libertarians may well wonder whether
jury unanimity should be necessary to acquit a criminal defendant. If so, the consequence is
that the prosecutor needs only one sympathetic juror to hang a jury and inflict another trial
on defendant.").
163 See ABRAMSON, supra note 144, at 191-94.
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jurors on board with them in order to prevail. This may cause that bloc to
carefully engage the concerns of those jurors who hold a different
viewpoint, by a constructive and rational dialogue that attempts to reach
complete consensus. 164 (However, there is some evidence that in reality,
more often the minority position is simply overpowered by intimidation, a
concern that the court-martial's secret voting practice addresses quite
effectively. 165) Promoters of unanimity argue that permitting non-
unanimous verdicts will allow the majority bloc to simply ignore the
viewpoint of those few jurors who are not convinced of guilt, once the
majority bloc perceives it has achieved an apparent majority position.1 66 In
other words, unanimity proponents fear that once a sizeable group of jurors
senses (by a straw vote or other informal expression of individual positions)
that it has accumulated sufficient power to convict, that bloc will simply
stifle any further debate and terminate the collegial deliberative process,
ending the "rough-and-tumble of the jury room [that sometimes allows a
forceful dissident minority] to reverse completely [the initial majority's]
perception of guilt or innocence." 167  They argue that the unanimity
requirement acts as an "automatic check against hasty fact-finding [because
it places on all jurors] the duty to hear out fully the dissenters."
168
This argument has several weaknesses. First, it overlooks the very real
possibility that the unanimity requirement allows for precisely the opposite
scenario: that one determined juror, irrationally convinced of innocence,
can ignore any further debate or appeal to reason, 169 thus deadlocking the
decision or worse, stalemating the majority jurors until they capitulate and
''unanimously" vote not guilty.
In such a situation, the unanimity requirement for criminal conviction
might be supported by the familiar maxim that it is better to let many guilty
'64 See id.
165 See id. at 197 (discussing data showing the widespread phenomena of intimidation
within unanimous juries). Note that the unique military practice of secret balloting by jurors
as they reach a verdict provides an important structural protection against such intimidation.
See discussion infra Section III.D.
166 Kachmar, supra note 144, at 274.
167 Johnson v. Louisiana, 406 U.S. 356, 389 (1972) (Douglas, J., dissenting); see Taylor-
Thompson, supra note 144, at 1264.
168 Johnson, 406 U.S. at 389 (Douglas, J., dissenting).
169 See Amar, supra note 96, at 1191. One reported instance of exactly such a refusal to
deliberate is provided by the prominent capital case involving terrorist Zacarias Moussaoui.
After the jury recommended a life sentence rather than the death penalty, the jury foreman
explained that the single holdout juror refused even to discuss why he or she believed the
death penalty to be inappropriate, repeatedly deadlocking the jury at eleven-to-one on the
death penalty. See Dwyer, supra note 161, at Al.
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people go free than to convict one innocent person. 70 In the context of how
a jury arrives at its verdict, we ought not to accept that postulate so readily.
If the stakes were limited to a communal act of moral classification of
conduct, that maxim might be defensible. However, the felony criminal
trial is not simply an effort by the community to label the criminal with a
mark of community opprobrium (the conviction). Instead, the felony trial
has a significantly more weighty objective; it exists to determine whether an
accused has engaged in such seriously criminal behavior that society ought
to impose a penalty, or sentence, either to directly prevent further crime by
the same criminal (i.e., by restraint of his liberty) or to serve as an example
for others contemplating such crimes (by general deterrence). No such
decision made by any group of jurors, unanimously or by majority
consensus, is infallible. Recognizing that, because of human frailty, either
form of decision (unanimous or super-majority verdict) can result in the
erroneous acquittal of a culpable person or the erroneous conviction of an
innocent person, the community ought to choose the mode that is less likely
to result in error. In other words, we ought to allow for a verdict of guilt
based on an overwhelming consensus of the jurors, even if some tiny
fraction of the jury does not agree. Likewise, we ought to provide that
when the same substantial fraction of the jury is not convinced of guilt
beyond any reasonable doubt, the jury must return a verdict acquitting the
defendant outright, as the military jury practice requires.
There is another weakness in the oft-stated concern about the majority
cutting off useful discussion, refusing to listen to the minority's views once
the majority senses that it holds enough votes to dictate the verdict. That
argument is plausible only if one accepts two very doubtful propositions.
First, it supposes that the jurors in the majority bloc (or most of them)
are persons wholly indifferent to the viewpoint of others, or in other words,
that they not only have reached a decision with which they are comfortable,
170 "[T]he law holds that it is better that ten guilty persons escape than that one innocent
suffer." Coffin v. United States, 156 U.S. 432, 456 (1895) (quoting WILLIAM BLACKSTONE,
4 COMMENTARIES 27); see also Furman v. Georgia, 408 U.S. 238, 367 n.158 (1972)
(Marshall, J., concurring) ("We believe that it is better for ten guilty people to be set free
than for one innocent man to be unjustly imprisoned." (quoting William 0. Douglas,
Foreword, in JEROME FRANK & BARBARA FRANK, NOT GUILTY 11-12 (1957))).
This dubious value judgment is also a foundation for the exclusionary rule. That rule is
justified on the notion that if police have gathered evidence by some conduct evaluated later
as unlawful, then to exclude that evidence (despite its reliable, or even dispositive,
inculpatory value) and to let the defendant avoid the murder conviction he deserves is
preferable to letting the police officer "get away with" his own misconduct. See Olmstead v.
United States, 277 U.S. 438, 470 (1928) (Holmes, J., dissenting) ("I think it a less evil that
some criminals should escape than that the government should play an ignoble part.").
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but they are unwilling even to reexamine that position at the request of the
minority. Second, it presumes that those jurors are not only close-minded
and inflexible, but moreover, that they are willing to defy the specific
instructions of the judge that the jurors must engage in a full and free
discussion that allows all viewpoints to be aired before a vote is taken on
the verdict. If, however, these pessimistic assumptions about human nature
are accurate, then even more fundamental presumptions about the jury
process would be left in disarray (not least, the oft-stated presumption that
jurors will follow the instructions of the trial judge about the law). 7'
A more reasonable assumption is that the typical juror is a citizen who
will exercise the important trust placed in her as a representative of the
community, and who will act conscientiously and consistently as charged
by the trial judge and as she would want to be judged by others. Since our
very reliance on the jury presupposes that the citizen juror will carefully try
to follow the law, 7 2 we ought to trust that most jurors will take the time to
listen in good faith to the reasoning of all of the other jurors,
conscientiously evaluating all aspects of the evidence presented in the
context of the applicable law, before deciding the case.
In fact, the Supreme Court has relied upon precisely this reasonable
expectation about juror behavior, 173 and that reasoning was borne out by a
171 Our entire jury practice relies upon a host of such presumptions, such as: (1) that the
individual juror will agree with or vote for a guilty verdict only if convinced beyond
reasonable doubt; (2) that prospective jurors will conscientiously answer questions about
disqualifying matters in voir dire; (3) that jurors will heed the trial judge's admonition that
they must not consider any testimony that has been stricken from the record when they
nonetheless have already heard such testimony; and, not least, (4) that the jurors will not
hold it against the accused that he declined to testify in his own defense. Cf Amar, supra
note 96, at 1191 n.22 ("[I]f someone is intelligent and well-informed, should we not at least
consider using the scalpel of strict instructions-'you must base your verdict only on the
evidence admitted in this trial'-rather than the sledgehammer of exclusion? A judge with
comparable knowledge is not disqualified here. Why do we trust judges so much and jurors
so little?").
172 Thus, federal and state courts recognize that while jurors have the "raw power" to
ignore the court's instructions about the law, the jury has no legal authority or right to do so;
the jurors' "duty is to apply the law as given to them by the court." United States v.
Sepulveda, 15 F.3d 1161, 1190 (1st Cir. 1993); see, e.g., United States v. Gonzalez, 110 F.3d
936, 94748 (2d Cir. 1997); United States v. Hardy, 46 M.J. 67, 74-75 (C.A.A.F. 1997);
People v. Engelman, 49 P.3d 209, 214 (Cal. 2002); Holden v. State, 788 N.E.2d 1253, 1255
(Ind. 2003); Commonwealth v. Sok, 788 N.E.2d 941, 951 (Mass. 2003); Hansen v. State,
592 So. 2d 114, 140 (Miss. 1991); State v. Jenkins, 861 A.2d 827, 837 (N.J. 2004); Ramos v.
State, 934 S.W.2d 358, 367 (Tex. Crim. App. 1996); Henderson v. State, 976 P.2d 203, 206
(Wyo. 1999).
173 Johnson v. Louisiana, 406 U.S. 356, 361 (1972) ("[Ilt is far more likely that a juror
presenting reasoned argument in favor of acquittal would either have his arguments
answered or would carry enough other jurors with him to prevent conviction. A majority
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recent high profile case. Even in the emotional atmosphere of the sentence
deliberations for terrorist Zacarias Moussaoui (convicted of complicity in
the multiple murders caused by the September 11, 2001 destruction of the
World Trade Center), there is evidence from post-trial news accounts that
the majority of jurors were solicitous of the viewpoint of the minority.
Though leaning toward the death penalty, the eleven jurors in the majority
took several days in their deliberations, raising and analyzing possible
arguments against the death penalty, so that the single juror who was
blocking the death penalty would not feel isolated.
74
The Supreme Court's expectation that most jurors are fair-minded
enough to carefully consider the views of other jurors is also borne out by
my own experience with military juries. On numerous occasions, I have
seen military juries stay in closed deliberations for a number of hours
before reaching a verdict, even when the evidence pointing to the guilt of
the accused soldier was overwhelming. Either those jurors were taking the
time to deliberate conscientiously and to consider the views of each
member of the jury, as my instructions had directed, or they found the
closed confines of the jury room to be so fascinating in comparison to their
normal duties that they were pretending to stay busy for long periods of
time. (That the military juror realizes that he contributes to the one
determination on behalf of the community of the defendant's innocence or
guilt, and cannot hand that responsibility off to a subsequent jury by
deadlock as in civilian practice, very likely also contributes to the gravity of
the deliberations in a court-martial.175)
Together with the provision for a secret vote by each juror, permitting
the jury to reach its verdict by non-unanimous decision actually gives jurors
with the minority viewpoint a greater incentive to continue to press their
position. The one or few jurors who disagree with the emerging majority
position will realize that they may well be able to change the outcome of the
voting if they can manage to convince just one or two more jurors to accept
their viewpoint, or to at least entertain reasonable doubt about the guilt of
the accused. By contrast, if no verdict of acquittal can be reached without
will cease discussion and outvote a minority only after reasoned discussion has ceased to
have persuasive effect or to serve any other purpose-when a minority, that is, continues to
insist upon acquittal without having persuasive reasons in support of its position. At that
juncture there is no basis for denigrating the vote of so large a majority of the jury ....").
174 See Dwyer, supra note 161. According to the jury foreman, "the whole group would
raise anti-death penalty issues because that way the lone dissenter would not feel isolated or
,ganged up on.' Deliberations continued [for another three days], but the foreman said the
lone dissenter still did not raise any issues." Id. Eventually, the frustrated majority voted to
recommend a life sentence. Id.
175 See discussion infra Section III.C.3.
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unanimous agreement, a minority bloc favoring acquittal will be
discouraged because it faces the much more daunting task of changing
every other juror's mind in order to reach the desired outcome. 1
76
Supporters of the unanimity requirement also argue that it is necessary
to protect unpopular or vulnerable minorities.177  However, the Supreme
Court has logically rejected the idea that every jury that is tasked to judge a
person from an identifiable minority demographic category, such as a
person "belonging to" some ethnic, racial, or religious minority, must
necessarily include jurors identified with that minority category.
178
Moreover, if one accepts the underlying assumption that most "minority"
jurors will act to protect others from their "own" minority group, that idea
cuts both ways. In other words, it suggests that another weakness of
verdicts where unanimity is required is that minority jurors may irrationally
block conviction just because the defendant is from their minority group.
1 79
These cracks in the traditional assumptions about the superiority of
unanimous verdicts ought to make us willing to pay closer attention to
Amar's "tentative" suggestion to consider allowing super-majority verdicts
but surrounding them with some safeguards. 180 He suggests that the danger
of the hasty end to deliberations might be reduced by more thoroughly
instructing the jurors about their deliberative responsibilities:
[N]onunanimous schemes can be devised to promote serious discussion. Jurors
should be told that their job is to talk and listen to others with different ideas, views,
176 See discussion infra note 199 and accompanying text.
177
Nonunanimous decisionmaking in criminal trials could jeopardize the limited victories that
historically excluded groups have won in cases challenging barriers to jury service. If-as is
often true-the views of jurors of color and female jurors diverge from the mainstream,
nonunanimous decisionmaking rules can operate to eliminate the voice of difference on the jury.
Given that people of color tend to form the numerical minority on juries, the majority could
ignore minority views by simply outvoting dissenters."
Taylor-Thompson, supra note 144, at 1264.
178 See Powers v. Ohio, 499 U.S. 400, 404 (1991) ("Although a defendant has no right to
a 'petit jury composed in whole or in part of persons of [the defendant's] own race,' he or
she does have the right to be tried by a jury whose members are selected by
nondiscriminatory criteria.") (citation omitted).
179 For example, some newspaper stories suggested that many Americans viewed the
acquittal of 0. J. Simpson by a California jury as irrational because overwhelming evidence
of his guilt was demonstrated on national television. See David Robinson, Jr., The Shift of
Balance of Advantage in Criminal Litigation: The Case of Mr. Simpson, 30 AKRON L. REV.
1, 2, 8 n.44 (referring to "[wihat has widely been perceived as an unjust exoneration of O.J.
Simpson" and citing several newspaper articles about the Simpson acquittal). The jury that
acquitted Mr. Simpson, an African-American defendant, included a substantial number of
African-American jurors. Id. at 10 n.57.
180 Amar, supra note 96, at 1189-91.
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backgrounds and so on. So too, judges can advise jurors that their early deliberations
should focus on the evidence and not their tentative leanings or votes-and that no
straw poll should be taken until each juror has had a chance to talk about the evidence
on both sides.
1 8 1
3. Eliminating the Hung Jury
Compared to military jury trials, which cannot end with the jury
deadlocked on culpability, the civilian jurisdictions' emphasis on unanimity
as the sine qua non of final judgment carries significant cost. Each trial that
results in a deadlocked jury is a case where, by definition, the defendant's
culpability has not been resolved. An election by the defendant to plead
guilty eventually will resolve some cases. 182  But for those cases not
concluded by such a plea, the remaining alternatives (retrial or dismissal of
the case) may well be unfair to the defendant and certainly are inefficient
for the community.
If the defendant knows he is guilty of the offense, the delay involved
in retrial at least postpones his day of reckoning, and if retrial is aborted by
the prosecution's decision to dismiss instead of retrying the case, the
defendant obtains a windfall. But in those cases where the defendant
believes himself to be innocent, the unfairness lies in the significant costs of
remaining in legal jeopardy for the time that retrial consumes. Not only
does the accused person incur the cost of additional legal representation, he
continues to suffer under the cloud of suspicion within the community and,
especially if in pretrial detention, may well incur substantial opportunity
costs (loss of earnings or time with family). Further, while in the crosshairs
of the prosecutor, the defendant faces these many costs knowing that a
second hung jury may result, which would afford the prosecutor yet another
opportunity to shop--not for a more effective presentation-but instead for
a more easily-convinced set of twelve jurors who will agree to convict.
From the perspective of the community, either dismissal of the case or
retrial is often less than satisfactory. Dismissal of the allegations, when
based not on acquittal but upon failure to reach a verdict, leaves the victims
and the public generally without closure, the case permanently unresolved.
If the district attorney elects to bring the case to trial in front of a new jury,
that adds to the criminal case backlog. Further, unless new evidence
fortuitously surfaces, the retrial will be prosecuted based on older
evidence. 183 Since the prosecution likely put on its best effort to convict at
"' Id. at 1191.
182 Understandably, both the prosecution and the defendant frequently are prodded into a
pretrial agreement by their failure to prevail with the first jury.
183 Physical evidence generally does not age well; it may be lost or contaminated through
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the first trial, the new set of jurors usually faces the unenviable task of
grappling with a case with evidence no more compelling (and certainly
more stale) than the first jury evaluated.
If deadlocked juries were exceedingly rare, none of this would be
terribly important except to those persons immediately involved in the case.
However, the problem of hung juries is a substantial one in the United
States, both in the forty-eight states that require jury unanimity and in the
two that allow super-majority verdicts. While comprehensive data is
scarce, 184 a number of sources suggest that state hung jury rates may be as
high as 6% of all criminal trials.185 Considering that the number of state
criminal jury trials was estimated to be "in the vicinity of 150,000" per year
a decade ago,' 86 that 6% is not a negligible figure.
Changing from unanimous to super-majority verdicts in state trials
may reduce the rate of hung juries187 but will not, by itself, eliminate the
jury deadlock situation because the Louisiana-Oregon approach still
requires a super-majority of the jurors to agree to acquit.' 88 However, the
unique approach used by the court-martial will eliminate the hung jury,
since a not guilty verdict will result whenever there is no conviction on the
mishandling. Witnesses may die or become incapacitated, and their memories seldom
improve over time.
184 Researchers face substantial
[d]ifficulty in gathering data about hung juries.... The key problem is that a hung jury is an
interim rather than a final disposition in a case. Courts typically do not report information about
interim dispositions such as hung juries as a separate category for statistical reporting purposes.
Court caseload statistics generally include only final dispositions such as dismissal, guilty plea,
acquittal, or conviction.
Paula L. Hannaford, Valarie P. Hans & G. Thomas Munsterman, How Much Justice Hangs
in The Balance?: A New Look at Hung Jury Rates, 83 JUDICATURE 59, 60 (1999).
185 See ABRAMSON, supra note 144, at 198 (stating there is a "national average of 5.6
percent [hung juries] in unanimous verdict jurisdictions"); Robert Boatright & Elissa Krauss,
Jury Summit 2001, 86 JUDICATURE 145, 150 (2002); McCord, supra note 152, at 305 n.7
("[The] hung jury rate in a composite of 30 large counties in criminal cases in the late 1990s
was 6.2%, but some counties had significantly higher rates, like 15% in Los Angeles County
over an 18-month period."). A detailed analysis of available state criminal trial data suggests
the "conventional wisdom" that the national average for hung juries is about 6% of all jury
trials is probably a safe estimate. See Hannaford, Hans & Musterman, supra note 184, at 61-
66.
186 See ABRAMSON, supra note 144, at 251; cf Hannaford, Hans & Musterman, supra
note 184, at 65.
187 For example, a study of one county in Oregon, where verdicts by ten-to-two are
permitted, see supra text accompanying note 104, during the period 1970 to 1972 showed a
hung jury rate of about 2.5%. ABRAMSON, supra note 144, at 198 & n.65.




charged offense or on any lesser-included offense.' 89 If adopted for use in a
state's criminal trials, the public would benefit from the resolution of
significant numbers of cases by means of a single trial. Moreover, some
defendants will receive an acquittal without unanimous agreement of the
jurors, and those persons will no longer remain in the legal limbo of further
jeopardy for the same charge.
In conclusion, the super-majority verdict not only provides for a
reliable verdict, but if it is employed in conjunction with the military jury's
approach (not guilty verdict when the number of guilty votes is short of the
fraction required to convict), the procedure will enhance the finality of the
trial process. Eliminating deadlocked juries will avoid both the inefficiency
for the public and the unfair costs for individual defendants that result from
hung juries.
D. THE ADVANTAGE OF USING THE COURT-MARTIAL'S UNIQUE
SECRET WRITTEN BALLOT TO REACH A VERDICT
As previously described, the jurors on a court-martial are required to
indicate their individual votes of guilty or not guilty by casting secret,
written ballots.' 90 Within American criminal systems, this practice appears
to be unique. By comparison, the current state practice of open voting' 91
necessarily puts enormous psychological pressure on each juror to conform
to the majority sentiment and, as will be explained here, jeopardizes the
bona fide nature of the verdict as the considered consensus of all twelve
jurors.
The open procedure by which the jury formally adopts its verdict
under the typical state practice leaves the individual juror no privacy of
position, no confidential sanctuary for the individual juror's conscience. In
other words, once the deliberative process reaches a certain static state, the
jury as a body will expect its individual members to register personal assent
to or dissent from the proposed verdict openly, because the judge did not
tell the jurors to do so by secret ballot. 92 When the individual jurors are
189 See supra text accompanying notes 129-131.
190 See discussion supra text accompanying note 121-127.
191 See discussion supra Section III.A.
192 In theory, any juror could propose to her peers on the jury that the jury takes its
official vote by secret ballot, because the author's research located no state pattern
instruction that explicitly told the jurors they were prohibited from such an approach.
However, human nature suggests that this would rarely occur in the setting of a jury of a
dozen strangers; for one or a few jurors to propose a secret ballot when the presiding judge
had not mentioned such a procedure would be tantamount to the troublemaker announcing




called upon to register their official positions openly in front of all fellow
jurors, they enjoy no safeguard against the peer pressure likely to be
inflicted upon a lone dissenter or those in the minority bloc, especially in
the vast majority of states where the verdict cannot be presented without
unanimous concurrence.
193
Even in Louisiana and Oregon, where super-majority verdicts are
allowed, the trial judge does not instruct the jurors to use a secret ballot to
register their ultimate personal views of whether a proposed verdict of
guilty or not guilty ought to be adopted. The degree of pressure on those
jurors who are resisting the proposed verdict will probably be less than in a
state requiring unanimity. However, even in those two states, it seems all
too likely that a majority, nearing the critical fraction required to reach a
verdict, may sometimes squeeze the several holdouts to get on board, not by
compelling force of reason, but simply by demanding that they give up,
show some loyalty to the group, and let the trial end.
The lack of any refuge behind a secret ballot intensifies the obvious
pressure on the holdouts. In all likelihood, once the jury has engaged in
some amount of discussion of the evidence and the issues presented, a
consensus position (representing the view of some considerable bloc of
jurors) is likely to emerge. When that occurs, the foreman or some other
juror will ask the obvious question, "Do we all agree with X position?" or
"How many of us agree with that position?" or some variant of that query.
The proposed verdict may be guilt, innocence, or acquittal based on doubt,
but in any case, as soon as the majority viewpoint is manifested (whether by
show of hands, head nod, or verbal response), any dissenter from that
position is immediately in the spotlight, and on the defensive. It will be
difficult enough for the dissenter to try to persuade other jurors to join her
position. With the open voting practice, any other juror who may be on the
cusp to join the initial dissenter's position must register his defection from
the majority bloc openly, without the cover of a secret ballot.
In contrast to the typical state practice that operates by open voting, the
military jury's secret ballot increases the likelihood that, having listened to
the viewpoint of all members of the jury, each juror will finally vote based
on her own conscientious evaluation of the merits, and not simply respond
to pressure to go along with others. 194 Indeed, under military law, the
193 While the secret ballot procedure was devised to protect military jurors from the
pressure of officers senior to them in rank, see supra note 126, a concern without direct
parallel in civilian life, our common experience suggests that peer pressure, especially
inflicted by a group, is a frequent and universal phenomena. See supra note 158 (citing
numerous cases in which coercion by other jurors was alleged).
194 United States v. Martinez, 17 M.J. 916, 919 (N-M.C.M.R. 1984) (saying that a secret
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obligation of the members to use the secret written ballot to determine the
verdict as to guilt or innocence for each particular charged offense is
considered a substantial safeguard for the accused. 95  If the jury's
discussions convince a military juror that the majority position is more
sensible, she may join it. If not, she may continue to try to persuade some
of the other jurors to adopt her viewpoint. If the psychological pressure on
her to join the majority increases to an uncomfortable level, she may defuse
it by decreasing the intensity of her dissenting expression or even by
pretending to go along with the others, knowing that she can keep her
conscience clear by ultimately voting as she believes she should, safe from
the others' scrutiny.196 In short, the military juror knows that in the final
analysis, no one else can prove how she actually voted, since each juror
casts her vote by secret written ballot. The final expression of position that
decides the verdict is a private expression of conscience by each juror,
made without risk of ridicule or pressure from the other jurors, and this
confidentiality reduces the likelihood that any juror will be stampeded by
pressure from others on the jury.' 97
The secret ballot approach used by courts-martial does not discourage
the jurors from participating in an open, collegial examination of the
evidence and all issues that face the jury. Before the jury retires to
deliberate, the judge instructs the military jury that its members have a duty
to engage in full and free discussion of the evidence. 198 Depending on the
complexity of the evidence, it is not unusual to see a military jury deliberate
for hours, asking through the bailiff that the judge permit them to send out
for a pizza so that they can continue. Sometimes, they will indicate to the
military judge that they anticipate needing considerable time for their
deliberations and ask to recess for a meal before continuing. In short, my
experience was that the military jury very seldom rushed to quickly take a
written ballot permits a member to vote his conscience); United States v. Chaplin, 8 M.J.
621, 627 (N.C.M.R. 1979).
195 United States v. Boland, 20 C.M.A. 83 (1970). Likewise, the members are required
to use the secret written ballot to determine whether to adopt a proposed sentence. United
States v. Greene, 41 M.J. 57, 58 (C.M.A. 1994). In both situations, the rationale behind the
secret written ballot rule is to prevent the unlawful use of superiority in rank to influence the
vote ofjunior members. Id.
'96 Martinez, 17 M.J. at 919 (noting that a secret written ballot permits a member to vote
his conscience, even if he previously agreed to a contrary position during the oral
deliberative process).
19' Chaplin, 8 M.J. at 627 (finding that military law emphasizes the secret written ballot
as "a proven preservative of the independence of military members as fact-finders and
sentencing bodies[, with s]ecrecy insulat[ing them] from pressures, whether by seniors,
juniors or peers" during and after trial).
198 MILITARY JUDGES' BENCHBOOK, supra note 66, 2-5-14.
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straw vote, determine the majority position, and then seal it with a quick
secret ballot.
Coupled with a provision that some form of verdict (guilty or not
guilty) will result from the collective (albeit not necessarily unanimous)
decision of the jury,' 99 the secret ballot encourages a dissenter to continue
reasoning with other jurors, because a single juror's shift of position may
change the verdict without the need to convert all other jurors to the same
position. The secret ballot encourages jurors, even if ostensibly
outnumbered in the open discussion, to continue to regard their own votes
as crucial; voting in secret keeps alive the hope by the minority that
vigorous advocacy of its perspective may eventually result in another juror
privately changing his position, so that the final outcome can be changed.
At worst, if the majority remains unmoved despite the dissenter's
explanation of her reasoning, the dissenter is outvoted without having had
to compromise her own conscientiously held position.
The ability of some meaningful fraction to block conviction (whether
one-third, one-quarter, or one-sixth of the twelve jurors), while preserving
the confidentiality of their conscientiously held view that the evidence does
not adequately prove guilt, is a more meaningful safeguard against
improper conviction than the unanimous verdict practice now used. One
can only speculate how often a so-called "unanimous jury" decision to
convict or to acquit a defendant is merely the result of nine, ten, or eleven
jurors finally wearing down, but not convincing, a few holdouts or one
holdout who cannot withstand the pressure to end the deliberations by
agreeing. If the majority succeeds in pressuring, but never persuading, the
dissenters to jettison their reservations so that the jury can reach a
unanimous final decision, that outcome does not further the goals of a
rational criminal justice system. By contrast, the military practice protects
each juror from the dilemma where she must either compromise her
personal, conscientious evaluation of the case or simply pass the buck to
another set of jurors by continuing a deadlock, unable to reach unanimity.
Further, when the community knows that the actual votes on the verdict
were cast confidentially, it adds to the sense that the jury's verdict
represents the aggregate of the conscientious views of its members and
enhances the legitimacy of that verdict.
The practice of requiring the jurors to finalize their verdict by a secret
ballot procedure, when used in conjunction with a procedure that allows a
substantial majority of the jurors to convict but that also provides for
acquittal when a significant number of jurors is not sufficiently convinced
199 See supra notes 127-131 and accompanying text.
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of guilt, will increase public confidence that the verdict was the product of
conscientious evaluation of the evidence and true consensus of the jurors,
rather than the result of intimidation or pressure within the jury.
IV. CONCLUSION
Overwhelmingly, state criminal systems still require the traditional
unanimous verdict in order to find a defendant guilty or to exonerate him,
although the Supreme Court has found no constitutional impediment to a
state using a super-majority verdict by a jury consisting of twelve persons.
In contrast to the typical state verdict procedure, the modem court-martial
practice for the past three decades shows that reliable verdicts can be
achieved by a super-majority of the jury. The traditional state process by
which the jury reaches a "unanimous" verdict suffers from the real danger
that such "unanimity" may actually result from psychological pressure on
holdout jurors that overcomes their honest individual misgivings about the
verdict, rather than by persuasion of all jurors during consensus-building
deliberations. The military jury uses a unique procedure that avoids that
danger; after military jurors deliberate together, the jurors cast their
individual votes of guilty or not guilty using a secret written ballot to
determine the members' collective verdict. Supreme Court decisions
affirming convictions reached by a super-majority of a state twelve-person
jury show that the states have the constitutional latitude to adopt the
military verdict approach. If the three unusual features of military jury
practice (permitting a non-unanimous verdict, providing for a default
acquittal, and requiring secret balloting) are adopted for use in state
criminal trials, those trials are likely to achieve verdicts that more
accurately reflect the conscientious views of the jurors than do the present
so-called unanimous verdicts. Additionally, adoption of the court-martial
verdict practice will eliminate the potential for a hung jury because a jury
following the military procedure will reach a not guilty verdict for any
allegation whenever the balloting by the jurors does not result in enough
guilty votes to meet the requisite threshold for conviction. Such a
procedure, unlike the present practice in state trials (where no verdict to
acquit can be reached without unanimity), will promote the public interest
in timely resolution of criminal allegations and will avoid the unfairness of
continued jeopardy endured by an accused facing re-trial after jury
deadlock.
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